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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONAL FERRIN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CLYDE W. FERRIN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JOHN A. HENDRICKS 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
712 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
COMPLAINT 
1. On or about the 1st day of January, 1948, plain-
tiff and defendant, in the City of Ogden, County of 
Weber, State of Utah, entered into a partner.ship rela-
tion under the firm name of Ogden Alfalfa Mills for 
the purpose of carrying on a feed mill whole·sale busi-
ness, and during all times herein mentioned said plain-
tiff and defendant entered upon and continued to trans-
act such partnership business under such firm name. 
2. That the purchase price of .said mill, a tract of 
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land upon which said mill is located and a home located 
thereon, was the sum of $39,500.00, all of which sum has 
been paid in full to the seller, John Hawks, and that 
the value of said business is in excess of the $39,500.00 
at the time of the filing of this action. 
3. That since January 1, 1948, plaintiff and de-
fendant operaJted said business as partners, established 
a partnership checking account with the signatures of 
both parties necessary on checks drawn on ~aid account; 
that the Ogden Alfalfa ~fills is known by those with 
which it transacts business as a partnership and the 
utilities are billed against said parties as a partnership. 
4. That since the oommencements of said partner-
ship defendant has drawn a sum of approximately 
$3,000.00 in exce·ss of that drawn by plaintiff, repre-
~enting payment to defendant partially on his own per-
sonal obligations and partially on wages for extra hours 
which said claim plaintiff hereby denies. 
5. That on or about the 20th day of April, 1955, 
defendant misappropriated a check in the sum of 
$1,731.60, payable to the partners by the Globe A1 Mills 
of Ogden, Weber County, Utah, and said check was 
endorsed and placed in a separate checking account in 
the name of Clyde \V. Ferrin and l\Irs. Clyde ,V. Ferrin 
in the Bank of Utal1, in Ogden, 'Yeber County, Utah; 
that such appropriation was wrongful and unauthorized 
by plaintiff and over which plaintiff has no control .and 
that by reason of .said appropriation and excess draw-
ing of wages defendant has bec<nne indebted to said 
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partnership and to plaintiff herein. 
6. That for some time last past plaintiff has de-
manded of defendant that he pay a fair division of the 
profits of said partnership and that he account for the 
money and property belonging to said partnership and 
that defendant has refused .and neglected and still does 
refuse and neglect to account for said money and said 
property or any part thereof. 
7. That during all times herein mentioned and at 
the present time defendant has been living in the home 
belonging to said partnership, together with his wife 
and four children and that until approximately March 
27, 1955, plaintiff also lived in said home, but since said 
date has been forced to move and that plaintiff alleges 
that defendant .should pay into the partnership a sum 
equal to the reasonable rental value of said home. 
8. That defendant has control over the checking 
accounts hereinabove referred to so that plaintiff is 
unable to obtain wages or salary or division of profits 
with which to sustain himself; that plaintiff is fearful 
that unless defendant is restrained from wrongfully 
disposing of the partnership properties, including check-
ing account, moneys and other real and personal property 
that said partnership business will he injured and that 
plaintiff will suffer loss thereby, therefore, plaintiff 
allege.s that an order to show cause and citation should 
issue ordering defendant to show cause, if any he has, 
why he should not allow plaintiff 50 per cent of the busi-
ness profits as his share of the profits until otherwise 
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ordered by this Honorable Court and why he .should not 
be restrained from disposing of the moneys or properties 
of the partnership in o~her than the nonnal course of 
business. 
9. 'That plaintiff alleges an accounting should be 
had of the partnership and the claims of the partners 
hereto be determined and the division of profits be made 
on a just and fair basis; that the partnership be dis-
solved .and a receiver appointed to determine the value 
and condition of said partnership to take charge of all 
of the property belonging to said partnership, together 
with the usual powers and duties and under the usual 
directions afforded such receiver. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment: 
1. That the partnership be dissolved; that -the 
business be wound up and sold and a just and equitable 
division be made between the parties herein. 
2. That an order to show cause and citation issue 
to defendant ordering him to show cause, if any he ha:;, 
why he should not be restrained from disposing of 
partnership property other than in the normal course 
of business, why plaintiff should not be allowed one-
half of p.artnership profit during th~ pendency of this 
action, why defendant should not return partnership 
money to the regular partnership account and why a 
receiver should not be appointed. 
DONAL FERRIN 
Plaintiff 
Verified June 1st 1955 by Plf 
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ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
Defendant admits and denies as follows: 
1. Admits that on or about the 1st day of January, 
1948, under coercion of their father, A. M. Ferrin, 
plaintiff and defendant entered into a partnership agree-
ment to operate the Ogden Alfalfa Mills. 
2. Admits paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint. 
3. Admits p,aragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint. 
4. As to paragraph 4, defendant admits that he 
ha.s withdrawn from the business $2996.00 more than 
the plaintiff has. Defendant admits that that amount 
was the amount partially due him on wages for manage-
ment, overtime and bagging. 
5. As to paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint, de-
fendant admit'S that on or about the 30th day of April, 
1955, a banking account was opened in which the sig-
nature of the plaintiff was not necessary for the cash-
ing of che:cks. · Denies each and every other allegaJtion 
set out in said paragraph 5. 
As to paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint, defend-
ant admits that the plaintiff has demanded money from 
him but denies that any money was due to the plaintiff 
from the profits of the business. 
Defendant denies that he refused to make an ac-
counting and asserts that he was willing .at all times to 
make an acounting. That the firm of Bunker and Tan-
ner were engaged to make that accounting. 
7. As to paragraph 7 of pl,aintiff's complaint, the 
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defendant admits 'that he has lived continuously in the 
house with his wife and four children, and that the 
plaintiff lived there also and still holds the key to one 
room thereof and keeps said room locked. That the 
defendant was allowed to so occupy the home under 
said partnership agreement. 
Defendant denies that he owes any rental what-
soever for the home prior to April 30, 1955. 
8. As to paragraph 8 of plaintiff's complaint, de-
fendant admits that he has control over the checking 
accounts. Denies that the plaintiff is entitled to any 
wages or any division of profits for any period subse-
quent to J\tiay 1, 1955. Denies each and every other alleg-
ation in paragraph 8. 
9. As to paragraph 9 of plaintiff's complaint the 
defendant admits that an accounting of the partnership 
up unto the 30th day of A.pril, 1955, should be made, 
and that the defendant is willing and able to make that 
accounting at any tin1e. Defendant alleges that the 
partnership-at-will \Yas dissolved as of :\Iay 1, 1955, 
and thrut he so notified the plaintiff. 
Defendant alleges there is no reason for the ap. 
pointlnent of a receiyer. That the rights of the plain-
tiff can runply be protected by an order of the Court 
dissolving the partnership and detennining the amount 
the plaintiff has due hun for his share in the business, 
jf any. 
Defendant denies en.'rything in plaintiff's con1plaint 
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not here,tofore admitted. 
COUNTER-CLAIM 
The defendant, for affirmative defense and counter-
claim, allege.s: 
1. Defendant alleges that the parties have operated 
the Ogden Alf.alfa Mills in Weber County, Utah, and that 
the plaintiff and defendant are both residents of Weber 
County, Utah, and have been at all times herein men-
tioned. 
2. That on or about the 1st day of J anuacy, 1948, 
the plaintiff under coercion of his father, A. M. Ferrin, 
entere dinto a partnership-:at-will agreement to operate 
the Ogden Alfalfa Mills. 
3. That the said A. M. Ferrin, together with the 
defendant and two other brothers, George Ferrin and 
Leonard Ferrin, in 1946 entered into a partnership to 
conduct the same busines.s and took an option to buy 
the Alfalfa Mills, plant .and business for $39,000.00. 
That on or about January 1, 1948, this partnership was 
dissolved and the option to buy the Ogden Alfalfa Mills 
was assigned to the pre.sent partnership. That A. M. 
Ferrin and Leonard Ferrin left in the business .as a 
loan to plaintiff and defendant the amounts of their 
profits from the old partnership, amounting to about 
$9000.00, that since 1948 defendant has invested $965.00 
in cash in the busine~s.s. That the defendant, Clyde W. 
Ferrin, l~eft his profits due him from the old partner-
. s}:lip and equipment that he had personally contributed 
in the amount of about $9000.00; that the said A. M. 
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Ferrin insisted and coerced the defendant into accepting 
the plaintiff, Donal Ferrin, as a partner in the business, 
notwithstanding the fact that the said plaintiff, Donal 
Ferrin, had no experience nor any money to invest in 
the business. 
4. That the defendant demanded and so made a 
partnership agreement that unless the plaintiff, Donal 
Ferrin, invested as much money as he had in the busi-
ness and worked as many hours as the defendant did 
that the defendant should receive $50 a month for over-
time and management of the business, together with $30 
a month extra for bagging of the alfalfa meal which is 
a dirty and disagreeable job and injurious to the health 
and well-being of the defendant. 
5. It was mutually agreed by the partnership that 
the defendant should continue to occupy the home with 
his family and that the plaintiff was to occupy one room 
and have his meals prepared for him and his room taken 
care of by the defendant's wife. 
6. That the plaintiff never, during the period from 
January 1, 1948 to April 30, 1935. invested any capital 
of any kind in the business; that the plaintiff worked 
when he wanted to and at what jobs he wanted to but 
absolutely refused to do any of the bagging of the meal 
and never worked in excess of eight hours a day. 
7. Tha;t the plaintiff violated the partnership agree-
ment by not devoting all of his tune to the business. 
He refused and failed to acquaint hiinself with the de-
tails of the busine~ss, such as the proper mixture of hay 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for grinding, learning the market or soliciting business. 
He would leave the premises without notifying the de-
fendant so that he could get someone to take his place 
without del1aying the work, and did absent himself from 
the business for as long as thirty days at a time. When 
the defendant complained to their father, A. M. Ferrin, 
about this, he would always say: "Don will do better; 
just keep him on and he will do better." But inste.ad 
of doing better he became more arrogant, he refused to 
cooperate in the purchasing of new equipment when it 
was needed, continuously demanded money. 
8. Beginning in the month of April, 1955 the plain-
tiff became more arrogant and more undependable. His 
arrogance and f.ailure to cooperate caused the business 
to suffer a loss for the year of 1954. Defendant, finding 
it unprofitable and impossible to longer conduet the 
business with the plaintiff as a partner, on or about the 
15th day of April, 1955, notified the plaintiff that the 
partnership-at-will had ended. That he would r.ender 
an accounting and pay the plaintiff ~all sums due to him 
by reason of his interest in the partnership. On or 
about April 20, 1955, the plaintiff, Donal Ferrin, noti-
fied the defendant that he was through and walked off 
the premises and never worked as 'a partner again. De-
fendant notified the plaintiff that the partnership..:at-
will would cease and be final at the end of April 30, 
1955, that an accounting would be rende·:red and the 
defendant would be paid ~all that he w.as rightfully en-
titled to for his interest in the partnership. 
9. That the books and r~ecords of the company have 
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been audited by the firm of Bunker and Tanner. Re-
sults of ~their audit will be available in the immediate 
future. The books show that the total profits of the 
business from J1anuary 1, 1948, to and including April 
30, 1955 to be $52,010.08. That during that period the 
plaintiff, Donal Ferrin, has withdrawn from the company 
$26,688.50. That the defendant has withdrawn from the 
business $29,644.45. 
10. That the defendant, Clyde Ferrin, is entitled to 
$80.00 for eighty-four months for overtime, manage-
ment and bagging in the sum of $6720.00 or in lieu there-
of is willing to divide the profits in the ration of 65 to 
35 percent. The records also show that the book value 
of the current assets on April 30, 1955 amounted tot 
$4,77 4. 72. That the book value of the land, plant and 
equipment is $21,348.23. That there are liabilities ae-
cording to the books, amounting to $19,736.91. Included 
in that sum is $12,242.92 which the books show is owed 
to A. M. Ferrin and Leonard Ferrin. This defendant 
denies that this sum should be in exce~ of $9000.00. 
Because of said audit, an accounting can be made forth-
with and the only question to be decided by the Court 
would be the .an1ount defendant should pay to the plain-
tiff for his interest in the business and property. 
"\VHEREFORE, defendant prays that the plaintiff's 
complaint be dis1nissed, that an order be 1nade by the 
Court dissolving the partnership as of April 30, 1955. 
That a time be set for taking eYidenee as to the value 
of the plaintiff's interest in the p.artnership, "~hich the 
defendant should pay to the plaintiff. That the defend-
10 
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ant is entitled to return of the money he invested in 
the business, together with the legal rate of interest and 
$80.00 per month for eighty-four months for wages for 
management, overtime and meal bagging. 
That any appropriate order needed for the pro-
tection of the plaintiff's interest in the partnership busi-
ness and the property be made that will protect the 
plaintiff's said interest, and whatever other order that 
may be necessary; and that the plaintiff be required 
to make a conveyance to the defendant of his inte~re.st 
in the partnership business and property. 
/s/ CLYDE W. FERRIN 
The business of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills is buying 
baled alfalfa hay, grinding it into meal and disposing 
of the product to the manufacturers of poultry and 
,animal feeds. The pl:ant consists of 8 acres of ground, 
a small dwelling house; a small building in which there 
is tool room, office, a storage room and a repair shop; 
a large corrugated iron shed about 80 feet by 60 feet 
in one corner of which is located the hay chopper, or 
grinding mill and bagging r.oom, together with tools, 
electrical equipment, truck and necessary implements 
and a large platform scales for weighing loads of hay 
and ect. Hay is generally purcha;sed during the haying 
season and st~acked in the shed and outside. Pillsbury 
and Globe Al Mills take about 90% of the product. 
Bagging is a hot, hard and dirty job. The man who 
does it wears a mask and through out the trade gets 
an extr:a wage. 
11 
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In 1945 A.M. Ferrin and his bachelor son, Leonard, 
farmed together in Eden, Weber County, Utah. A. M.'s 
sons Clyde and George operated farms in Huntsville, 
near Eden, and made and sold alfalfa meal on a partner-
ship basis. In the fall of 1945 Father Ferrin negotiated 
a two year lease of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills with J. B. 
Hawks, owner, together with an option to buy. He 
formed a partnership with his three sons and ordered 
George and Clyde to sell their farm and move to the 
Ogden Alfalfa Mills at Wilson. Clyde with his family 
were put in dwelling house. After operating the busi-
ness 1 ye,ar A. M., Leonard and George informed Clyde 
they would terminate the partnership .at the end of their 
lease. Clyde wanted to continue in the business and in 
M1ay of 1947 he went to Los Angeles, California, where 
J. B. Hawks was then residing, and negotiated an option 
to buy the Ogden Alfalfa .Jiills the terms being about 
the same as set forth in the exhibit to buy, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A. 
In order for Clyde to finance the deal he had to 
borrow the $9,000.00 down payn1ent. Father Ferrin and 
Leonard, had the n1oney. At tlris tin1e it should be pointed 
out that although Leonard was associated with his father 
in the loaning of the money and appeared with his 
father and plaintiff Donal in eYery appearance in court 
he never took the ·witness stand, nor did he eYer enter in-
to tlw discussions between parties; he apparently n1ade 
his father his sole agent. The plaintiff Donal, 28, and 
unmarried, and the youngest son of A. 1\f. returned home 
from the Service and a sojurn in the Northwest and 
12 
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~: 
worked for the partnership the last 7 or 8 months of 
1947, as a laborer. 
Father Ferrin refused to loan the $9,000.00 to Clyde 
unless Clyde would take Donal in as a partner, R 144 
B 48 & 92. Clyde strenuously objected to taking Donal 
jn a.s ,a partner but finally, in order to get the business, 
consented. A partnership was formed and the business 
of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills was conducted as such from 
January 1, 1948 until April 30, 1955. Clyde was to do 
the bagging and managing and Donal was to keep the 
books. That in June 1948 Robert Wangsgard, C.P.A., 
was engaged to do the firm's bookkeeping for tax pur-
poses and Donal each month would deliver the infor-
mation to Mr. W angsgard. 
Because of the omissions, misquotes and untelligi-
bility in parts in reporter J. L. May's transcript of pro-
ce:eedings, counsel for plaintiff and· defendant met with 
Judge Cowley in hi.s chambers on April 19, 1957, and 
it was agreed that had the transcript been correct, it 
would have shown: 'That on April 15, 1955 the defend-
ant informed the plaintiff that on April 30, 1955 he 
would dissolve and terminate the partnership, then exist-
jng between defendant and plaintiff, doing business as 
the Ogden Alfalfia Mills, and that after April 30, 1955 
he, the defendant, would conduct the Ogden Alfalfa Mills 
busine·ss as his own; that the defendant would pay the 
plaintiff a fair market Vlalue for his share of the assets 
of the business as of April 30, 1955; that defendant told 
the plaintiff if he desired to work after April 30th he 
would be paid on ~an hourly basis; that on April 20, 
13 
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1955, after a discussion between plaintiff and defendant, 
plaintiff told the defendant that he woul.d leave 'now' 1md 
that he would notify the defendant what he considered 
the value of his share in the business; that on or about 
April 20, 1955, Clyde, in order to carry on the business, 
went to the Bank of Utah and changed their checking 
account; the bank closed out the old account by applying 
the balance on the company's indebtednes~ and a new 
checking account ill the name of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills 
was made requiring the signature of either Doris or 
Clyde W. Ferrin. On April 28, 1955 counsel for the 
defendant received a letter, dated April 28, 1955, from 
Attorney I. Gordon Huggins, which said in substance 
that he had been requested by A. M. and Leonard Ferrin 
to represent them along with Donal, in the settlement 
of the partnership affairs; that the three of them had 
spent all morning in his office going over the business 
of the partnership and that he w.as directed by them to 
inform Clyde that he would have to pay A. M. and 
Leonard $11,200.00 in sert:tlen1ent of their claims against 
the partnership together ·with interest; that Clyde would 
have to pay Donal $16,200.00 in full settlement for his 
share in the partnership; and also that Donal had re-
quested l\[r. Huggins to ask Clyde to advance Donal 
at least $350.00 to tide Donal over during the negotia-
tion.s. On April :2~), 1955 plaintiff Donal called at the 
Inill and Clyde gave hin1 a check for $400.00 from the 
Ogden Alfalf.a l\lills checking account signed by Clyde 
W. Ferrin in compliance with his request.' The Judge 
instructed counsel that if they had any further difficulty 
14 
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1n ·applying the Reporter's transcript to their briefs 
they should meet with him on the matter. (End of agree-
ment with Judge Cowley.) 
During the month of May, 1955, there were con-
tinuous negotiations carried on between Clyde, Donal 
and Father A. M., but they got nowhere. Donal, A. M. 
and Leonard refused to arbitrate, R 144 B 66 & 96. The 
difficulty in arriving ~at settlement of this matter was 
cau.sed by failure of the plaintiff to set up a set of books 
and keep them as he was pledged to do and the further 
fact that he had made entries on the check book stubs 
about checks totaling $5,708.28 to be credited as business 
operating expense when the amounts should have been 
credited to his personal account as withdrawals and 
gave that false information to Mr. Wangsgard their tax 
accountant, R 144 B 33, Def. Exhibit 7, page 3; plaintiff 
failed to set forth the beginning inventory and the 
partnership agreement as to special wage's Clyde was 
to receive, if any. Those requirements are so elementary 
l:L that there is no excuse for the failure to do them by 
one who ha.s had 2 years college accounting. 
!: 
I~ 
The further .admitted facts by both the plaintiff 
and defendant are: That their partnership was a part-
nership at will; that Clyde's dutie;s were to manage, 
direct and keep the mill running and he was to do the 
bagging; that Donal was specially to do the bookkeeping 
and any other job assigned to him; that Clyde had a 
beginning investment and a subsequent investment total-
ing $1,015.00 ; that Donal never invested anything in 
the partnership during its existence from January 1, 
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1948 to April 30 1955 · and that each was to contribute 
' ' his best efforts toward the success of the business; 
that Clyde wa.s skilled in the management of the busi-
ness and in producing .a first rate product, which was 
the key to the success of the business; that there was a 
beginning inventory of hay and meal valued at $7,963.00 
testified to by A. M. Ferrin, R 144 B 167 ; that there 
was $9,030.01 in the bank January 1, 1948, Defendant's 
Exhibit 8. 
The books kept at the Mill consisted of receipt books 
from which receipts were issued to all who purchased 
meal in duplicate, the original was given to the pur-
chaser, the duplicate remaining in the book notations 
showed amount sold and terms, whether cash, credit 
or both; the same sort of a book for the purchase of 
hay, with notations of the weight, the price, the name of 
the sellor and if Georg~ hauled it, his ton mileage; n. 
bank deposit book was kept for the purpose of showing 
money received and deposited in the bank, usually by 
Donal; a book showing tune and wages of employees; 
if cash purchases of supplies were made the sales slips 
were kept, otherwise the Inonthly bills rendered by 
creditors were kept, and the n1ain reeord, in fact about 
the only record of expenditures was noted on the check 
book stubs. On about the first of e.ach 111onth the plain-
tiff would deliver this infonnation to J\fr. \Y angsgard, 
their accountant, R 14-! B 33. "Then J\fr. \Y angsgard had 
made the proper entries in the books in accordance with 
the infonlut.t}on supplied by Don, then they were re-
turned to the n1ill and the keeping of plaintiff. After 
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the end of the year Mr. Wangsgard would prepare and 
deliver to the partners a partnership tax return, a trial 
balance and profit and loss statement for the year which 
would be signed by the partners and filed with their in-
come tax returns. Copie·s were kept in the office files 
of the firm, D. Exh, 2, in the custody of plaintiff. 
About May 31, 1955, after the plaintiff and defend-
ant had failed to reach an accounting defendant's coun-
sel sugge.sted to plaintiff, A. M. and Leonard Ferrin 
and the!ir counsel, Mr. Huggins, that as it was .apparent 
that the services of an auditor would be needed in order 
to arrive at an accounting, there£ore they should join 
with the defendant in engaging a reliable accountant 
who had not been previously .associated with the partner-
ship business to conduct an audit, and that they agreed 
on the firm of Bunker & Tanner. Believing thi.s the 
defendant engaged the firm of Bunker and Tanner. 
After the firm had started working on the audit they 
called upon plaintiff and A. M. Ferrin for assistance 
and were informed by them that they had not engaged 
the auditors and would not help them in any way what-
soever. 
That on or about August 18, 1955 the defendant 
delivered to the plaintiff and intervenors' attorney, 
~Ir. I. Gordon Huggins, a copy of the Bunker-Tanner 
report on Audit of Ogden Alfalfa ]\Ells, Defendant's 
Exhibit 7. 
Defendant filed answer to order to show cause and 
appeared June 13, 1955. Defendant made a statement 
of facts, which he thought the plaintiff would stipulate 
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to but pl·aintiff · later refused; The defendant objected 
to the appointment of a receiver because it would be 
so expensive and useless. Suggested to the Court that 
action be delayed until the special audit was completed, 
continuances were granted until July 18, 1955. 
On July 18th Judge N orseth told the parties that 
they should either get together .and settle it or he would. 
Plaintiff's counsel after consulting with his clients, 
Donal, Leonard and A. ~f. Ferrin, offered to forego 
his request for a receiver if plaintiff would be allowed 
to work; defendant said he had no objection to the plain-
tiff working at $1.50 per hour provided the plaintiff had 
absolutely nothing to do with the management of the 
business and would work in harmony. Plaintiff's counsel 
prepared the order and Judge Norseth signed the order 
and left for his vacation. Defendant filed objections 
whieh were heard by Judge Cowley and by him over-
ruled; 
August 20, 1955, plaintiff served a citatio~ on de-
fendant to appear before the Court and show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt. This order 
to show cause was abandoned by the plaintiff. 
On about N ove1nber 9, 1955, A .. :i\L and Leonard 
Ferrin associated 1\fr. LeRoy B. Young as their counsel 
to file .a cmnplaint in intervention for tl1e 1noney owed 
the1n by the firm. Plaintiff answered confessing the 
amount sued, R 5+, for and a co1nplaint in intervention 
was filed N oven1ber 1-!, 1955, R 49. Defendant ~swered; 
denied that there was an "account stated" or that the 
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finn owed the intervenors the amount they sued for; 
alleged that the defendant had notified the intervenors 
on April 30, 1955 and continuously since that he was 
willing and able to pay them every cent they could prove 
the firm owed them, R 46. 
On ·N overnber 14, 1955 plaintiff requested the Court 
to is:sue an order to show cause on the basis of his affi-
davit, R 42; citation, R 44, issued for defendant to ap-
pear on November 21, 1955, R 44; defendant ,answered 
plaintiff's affidavit and order to show cause, R 52. 
H·earing on order to show cause held November 21, 1955, 
·minute entry, R 56, defendant found guilty of contempt 
of court, sentenced to 30 days in jail; jail sentence stayed. 
I. Gordon Huggins to prepare order. 
Pre-trial of intervenors action set for November 
23, 1955; trial of principal o~se set for January 6, 1956. 
On November 23, 1955, parties appeared for pre-
trial and defendant, in ~an attempt to get the whole matter 
settled, offered to stipulate· that he owed the inter-
venors $10,.000.00 if the plaintiff and intervenors would 
stipulate. that $35,000.00 was the fair market value of 
the business of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills partnership on 
the ~Oth day of April, 1955, they so stipulated. 
The. defendant moved the court in view of the set-
ting of the trial for January 6, 1956, that the court set 
a.side ·his orders on the order to show cause until after 
the 'taking of evidence' .at the trial as it was the defend-
ant's contention that the court had ruled on points at 
1ssue' Without the taking of evidence. 
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On November 30, 1955 plaintiff filed his affidavit, 
R 58 for an order to show cause citation alleging vio-
' lation of court order on order to show cause made on 
November 21 1955 · citation issued, R 60, as prepared 
' ' by Attorney Huggins and December 5, 1955 order on 
order to show cause, signed by Judge N orsclh, was filed, 
R 61. Objection filed by defendant. 
Case transferred to Judge Charles G. Cowley. 
Case set by Judge Cowley for January 10, 1956. 
December 27, 1955 plaintiff filed motion to amend 
complaint, alleging and praying for damages. Motion 
granted to file, R 73. 
December 27, 1955 order on order to show cause, 
R 7 4, defendant to turn over books to plaintiff on or 
before December 30, 1955; further action on orders to 
show cause continued till trial on the merits. 
The events after trial January 10, 1956, and before 
appeal to the Supreme Court w.as perfected are in a 
supplemental Record on ... -\._ppeal and with that is a t:ran~ 
script by court Reporter Cecil Tucker~ SR 42. 
This case crune on for hearing January 10, 1956, 
before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley. judge of the 
Second Judicial Di~triet, sitting without a jury. 
The Court took the case under advisen1ent, and on 
lVfareh 9, 1956, rendered the follo·wing verdict: (R 79) 
"The court finds that there was no agreement 
for defendant to receive extra pay for bagging 
and overtilne and denies defendant the sruue, 
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"The court further finds that defendant 
wrongfully expelled plaintiff from said partner-
ship on or about April 30, 1955, and plaintiff 
therefor is granted the following order: 
"1. That .said partnership be dissolved, af-
fairs of partnership be brought to a conclusion and 
partnership business sold. That an account be 
made since Jan. 1, 1948 to present, and profits 
be divided between partners .after debts and ex-
penses are paid. 
"2. To accomplish the foregoing act.s the 
court appoints a receiver, whether there is an 
appeal or not, to ta..lm over the partnership busi-
ness and property within a reasonable length of 
time and operate the same until ·an advantageous 
sale can be made. 
"The court does hereby appoint a receiver 
Mr. A. M. Ferrin if he is willing to serve or if 
not some other person to be named. Mr. A. M. 
Ferrin is hereby conilitiorrally appointed as re-
ceiver because of his knowledge and acquaint·ance 
with the business in que.stion and his ability to 
treat his two sons fairly who are the parties to 
this law suit. 
"The amount of the receivers bond will be 
fixed at a later date. 
"The court further finds that the contempt 
order made by the Hon. Parley E. Nor seth is a 
valid order, denies defendant's motion to vacate 
the same, finds that defendant failed to purge 
himself of said order, and further that the 30 
day jail sentence is in full force and effect, the 
court grants to the defendant a stay of execution 
of said j·ail sentence and another opportunity to 
purge himself of said contempt, provided he com-
plies with the order.s herein outlined, excepting 
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such legal rights a& he may exercise according to 
law. 
"
1The court further finds that plaintiff is 
entitled to damages in the sum of $1,000.00 for 
his wrongful expulsion by the defendant from 
th'e partnership business." 
"Plaintiff is entitled to costs." 
Counsel called that court's attention to the fact that 
he had not found as to the defendant's beginning inven-
tory nor as to defendant's right to interest on his capital 
investment. The court took the matter under further 
advisement and on :March 29, 1956, made these additional 
findings: (R 81) 
"The court finds that defendant is entitled 
to credit as his original cash inve-stment as be-
ginning inventory the sum of $3,804.29 and ad-
ditional cash investment later in the sums of 
$665.00 and $350.00 making a total oo.sh invest-
ment of $4,819.29. 
"The reasonable value of the equipment con-
tributed to the business by defendant as beginning 
inventory is found to be $1,180.71 making a total 
of cash and equipment tl1e sum of $6,000.00. 
"The Bear Cat Chopper is owned by defend-
ant and should not be included in the beginning 
inventory as claimed by defendant and which he 
claims was worth $1,000.00. Defendant is entitled 
to this item as his own property. 
"The two alleged $1,500.00 items were pri-
marily a gift to the new partnership and defend-
ant is entitled to only a ~4 interest in each item 
as a er<:'di t to hin1 for beginning inventory. 
"The $1,500.00 alleged value of each item is 
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an over valuation. . 
"The alleged $300.00 value for the bail loader 
and $700.00 for the old truck are likewise an over 
valuation. 
"The court hereby appoints the First Se-
curity Bank Trust Department to act as receiver 
in the above entitled case." 
The defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for 
a writ prohibiting the District Court from appointing a 
receiver. The plaintiff filed motion to dismiss the writ 
and on May 18, 1956, R 82, the supreme court dismissed 
the alternative writ. 
On the 29th day of May, 1956, Judge Cowley signed 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
Due to the fact that defendant had not been notified of 
the Supreme Court's ruling Judge Cowley on June 4, 
1956, withdrew the findings, conclusions .and decree to 
be resigned and refiled at a later date, R 84. On June 8, 
1956, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and 
objections to finding, conclusion and decree, R 83 and 85. 
These were heard on June 25, 1956, and motion for new 
trial was denied and objection denied except one wherein 
the ·court changed the judgment for damages from 
$1,000.00 to $1.00, R 98. Findings, conclusions and decree 
were signed June 25, 1956. 
The court appointed the First Security Bank Trust 
officer W. H. Loos as receiver on the 25th day of June, 
1956. Thereafter Mr. Loos engaged Mr. LeRoy B. Young 
of the firm of Young, Thatcher & Glasmann, as the re-
ceiver's attorney, and on July 11, 1956 the receiver and 
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attorney Young presented to Judge Wahlquist a tem-
por:ary order authorizing the receiver to employ Mr. 
Young as attorney and to employ the plaintiff and de-
fendant at $300.00 per month among other things and 
Judge Wahlquist .signed it in his chambers without notice 
to defendant, R Sup. 1. The receiver filed a petition for 
confirmation of that authority, among other things, R 
99. Defendant objected to the .appointment of :\fr. Young 
as attorney for receiver for the reason that he was 
attorney for the intervenors A. :\L and Leonard Ferrin, 
and that his firm was at that time attorney for J. W. 
Brewer Company in a suit filed against the Ogden Al-
falfa Mills in Ogden City Court for tires bought by the 
plaintiff in ~larch, 1956 and charged by him to the Ogden 
Alfalfa Mills; also objected to the same salary for both. 
Hearing was had on the receiver's petition and defend-
ant's objections thereto on August 20, 1956 before Judge 
Charles G. Cowley, who confirmed the appointment of 
Mr. Young and changed the compensation of Donal to 
$275.00 per month. 
~fr. Young for the recei\er and ~Ir. Huggins for 
plaintiff then petitioned the court to order the defendant 
to file a supersedas bond. Order for a supersedas bond 
in the sum of $3,500.00 was 1nade January 14, 1957, R 
144-C 19. On March 1S, 1957, they appeared in court 
seeking the removal of defendant as manager and oust-
ing hi1n frmn the house, R Sup. 26; This was denied 
Marrlt 30, 1957, R Sup. 35. 
Receiver filed inventory and appraisal October 30, 
1956, R. 118, property valued at $32,635.19, of that 
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amount $5,783.74 represented cash, merchandise and ac-
counts receivable, R. 119. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on or about the 1st day of January, 1948, 
in the City of. Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah, 
plaintiff and defendant entered into .a partnership at 
will and with the firm name of Ogden Alfalfa Mills; 
that since said date the parties transacted business under 
such firm name until April 30, 1955, on which said date 
defendant wrongfully and without c.au.se expelled plain-
tiff from such partnership business. 
2. That prior to this partnership agreement, defend-
ant, his father, A. M. Ferrin, and his two brothers, 
Leonard and George Ferrin, purchased the Ogden Al-
falfa Mills, composed of a mill, a tract of land upon 
which s.aid mill is located, and a home located thereon, 
for the sum of $39,500.00, which sum has been paid, and 
that on or about January 1, 1948, the interest of the 
original partners was terr;ninated and this partnership 
ther~upon took over the assets of the old. 
·3. That defendant is entitled to a beginning inven-
tory and 'he did contribute to s.aid business a total of 
cash and equipment in the sum of $6,000.00, .said capitol 
investment being composed as follows : an original cash 
investment of $3,804.29, with two additional cash invest-
ments later in the sum of $665.00 and $350.00, making a 
total cash investment of $4,819.29 and equipment with 
the reasonable value of $1,180. 71. The Court further 
finds that the defendant is entitled to the Bearca.t 
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Chopper as his own and separate property and should 
not be included in the beginning inventory and does 
not belong to the partnership; that as to the two $1,500.00 
items claimed by defendant, they were primarily a gift 
to the new partnership and that defendant is entitled 
to only a one-fourth interest in each item as credit for 
his beginning inventory, and further that the alleged 
value of such items are overvalued and that the $3,000.00 
alleged value for the bale loader and the $700.00 value 
for the ol.d truck are likewise overvalued, and the court 
further finds that defendant was not forced or coerced 
into accepting plaintiff into the partnership business 
but rather entered into the partnership arrangement with 
plaintiff of his own free will and choice. 
4. That plaintiff had no capital investment in said 
business. 
5. That there was no agreement between plaintiff 
and defendant to pay defendant extra money for over-
time or bagging or managen1ent of said busine.ss, and 
that defendant is not entiled to such, .and that the parties 
agreed that defendant and his family would occupy the 
home on the partnership property and belonging to said 
partnership and that plaintiff was to occupy one room, 
have his meals prepared for hun and his room taken care 
of by defendant's '\Yife. 
6. That from January, 1948, to April 30, 1955, plain-
tiff did not invest any capital in said business and that 
both plaintiff and defendant worked sufficient hours to 
transact partnership business norn1ally and that both 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the parties took a reasonable amount of time off from 
the business as vacation or time off. The Court further 
finds that defendant did not refuse to do any of the 
bagging of meal or refuse to work in excess of 8 hours 
a day, but r.ather finds that plaintiff agreed to do his 
share of the bagging if defendant would do his share 
of delivery of meal to customers, but that defendant re-
fused to so deliver. 
7. That the plaintiff did not violate the partnership 
agreement in any manner; that he did not refuse to 
acquaint himself with details of the business; that plain-
tiff did not take off an unreasonable time from the 
business ; that he did not delay work prejuidcially and 
that plaintiff did not become arrogant or refuse to co-
operate in the running of the business unreasonably; 
that no action of plaintiff caused the business to suffer 
a loss for the year 1954. 
8. That on or about the 15th day of April, 1955, 
defendant notified plaintiff that he was terminating or 
ending the partnership at will and that on or about the 
20th day of April, 1955, defendant misappropriated a 
check belonging to the partnership made by Globe A-1 
Mills, of Ogden, Utah to the Ogden Alfalfa Mills in the 
sum of $1,731.60, which said check was endorsed and 
placed in a separate checking account in the name of 
Clyde W. Ferrin and Mrs. Clyde W. Ferrin; that such 
appropriation was wrongful and contrary to the partner-
ship agreement and unauthorized by plaintiff, and that 
on or about the 30th day of April, 1955, defendant wrong-
fully expelled plaintiff from said partnership business 
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contrary to the partnership agreement or to the law; 
that since the 30th day of April,. 1955, defendant has had 
complete control over the checking accounts and over 
the compJete partnership business and property and has 
permitted plaintiff to work only when ordered to do so 
by this court. 
Bely'toraaf 
9. That plaintiff has made repeated demands upon 
defendant for an accounting and that defendant has re-
fused to account for such money and property; that on 
or about March 27, 1955, defendant was forced to move 
from the home belonging to the partership. 
10. That a certain audit was made by thefirm of 
Bunker & Tanner without plaintiff's consent but tp.at the 
audit does not represent a true showing <;>f the business 
and that the parties stipulated as to the withdrawal of 
the parties, and as to the value of the business for pur-
poses of this trial and that said audit is not to be used 
in the accounting to be made between· the parties heret'o. 
11. That for the purpose of this trial the parties 
stipulated that the sum of $35,000.00 would be the va.l'!le 
of said partnership bu.siness .and the co~ so finds;·that 
the parties hereto stipulated that defendant has with-
drawn from the partnership business the sum of $31,-
381.00 and the plaintiff has withdrawn the sum of $27,-
829.69 from January 1, 1948, to April 30, 1955, and. the 
court so finds. 
12. · That defendant is in contempt of court for fail-
ure to obey a valid order heretofore 1~ade by the Honor-
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able Parley E. N orseth, one of the judges of the above 
entitled court, made on or about the 21st day of N ovem-
ber, 1955, and signed on the 22nd day of November, 1955, 
in which said order defendant was sentenced to 30 days 
in the Weber County jail .and whereby the court further 
ordered that the sentence might be suspended if defend-
ant would purge himself of contempt of court, which 
said order defendant refused to comply with; that de-
fendant is to be granted a stay of execution of the 30 day 
jail sentence provided he complies with the decree of this 
Honorable Court except that defendant may exercise his 
rights of appeal according to law. 
13. That as a result of defendant's acts the part-
nership known as Ogden Alfalfa Mills shall be dissolved, 
the affairs of the partnership be brought to a conclusion, 
the partnership sold and that an accounting be made by 
the receiver from January 1, 1948, until said business is 
sold and the profits be divided between the partners in 
equal shares after the debts and expenses of the part-
nership, together with its dissolution are paid. 
14. That a receiver should be appointed whether 
there is an .appeal or not to take over the partnership 
business and property forthwith and operate said busi-
ne.ss until such a time as an advantageous sale can be 
made, and that the First Security B.ank Trust Depart-
ment should be appointed as such receiver. 
15. That because of defendant's wrongful acts, 
plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $1.00 nominal 
damages and that defendant should pay the same and 
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should pay for plaintiff's costs in this action. . 
From the foregoing Findings of Fa~t the court 
hereby makes the following: · 
CONCLUSIONS.OF LAW 
1. That the partnership be dis.solved; that the busi-
ness be wound up and _sold within a reasonable time, tha,t 
.an accounting be had since January 1, 1948, until .said 
partnership is sold, that the profits be divided between 
the partners in equal shares after all just debts and 
expenses of said partnership are paid. 
2. That in rendering ·an accounting between the 
parties hereto defendant is entitled to credit for his total 
inventory .and investmennt in the sum of $6,000.00. and 
th~ plaintiff is entitled to nothing; that plaintiff has 
withdrawn the sum of $27,829.69 as withdrawals from 
January 1, 1948, to April 30, 1955, and that defendant 
has withdrawn the sum of $31,381.00 from January 1, 
1948, to April 30, 1955. 
3. That the First Security Bank uf Utah Trust 
Department shall be. appointed to act as receiver of the 
partnership business known as Ogden Alfalfa Mills, to 
take over said partnership business forthwith Md to 
operate the same until an .advantageous sale can be ma.OO 
with all the necessary powers incident hereto and to fur-
ther render the accounting between the partners, ·whe~r 
there is an appeal from this decree or not. 
4. That defendant is not entitled to pay any 6-tra 
pay whatsoever for bagging or over tin1e or 1nanaging 
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the partnership business. 
5. That defendant is in contempt of court and the 
30 days jail sentence is in full force and effect, but that 
the defendant be granted a stay of execution upon said 
jail sentence and a further opportunity to purge himself 
of s.aid contempt provided he complies with the order and 
decree of this Honorable Court excepting such legal 
rights as he may exercise according to law. 
6. That plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages 
from defendant in the sum of $1.00 for his wrongful 
expulsion by defendant from the partnership business 
and that plaintiff is entitled to his costs in this action. 
Dated this 25th day of June, 1956. 
(S) CHARLES G. COWLEY 
Judge 
DECREE 
lT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that the partnership should 
be and hereby is dissolved, that the business be wound 
up and sold within a reasonable time, that an accounting 
be had since J.anuary 1, 1948, until said partnership 
is sold, that the profits be divided between the partners 
in equal shares after all just debts and expenses of said 
partnership are paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that in rendering an .accounting between the 
·partie.s hereto defendant should be and he hereby is en-
titled to credit for his total inventory and investment 
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in the sum of $6,000.00 and that plaintiff is entitled to 
nothing; that .Plaintiff. has withdrawn the s~ of $27,-
829.69 as withdrawals from January 1, 1948, to April 
30 1955 and that defendant has withdrawn the- sum of 
' ' $31,381.00 from January 1, 1948, to April 30, 195_5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that the First Security Bank of Utah Trust 
Department should be and hereby is appointed to act as 
receiver of the partnership bu_siness known as Ogden 
.Alfalfa Mills, to take over said partnership business 
forthwith and to operate the same until an advantageous 
sale can be made with all the necessary powers incident 
thereto and to further render the accounting between the 
partners, whether there is an appeal from this decree or 
not. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ~\DJUDGED AND 
DECREED that defendant is not entitled to any extra 
pay whatsoever for bagging or over time for managing 
the partnership business. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that defendant is in contempt of court and 
the 30 days jail sentence is in full force and effect, but 
that the defendant should be and hereby is granted a 
stay of execution upon said jail s~ntence and a further 
opportunity to purge hilnself of said contempt, pro-
vided he co1nplies with the order and de<}ree of this 
Jionorable Court excepting such legal rights as he may 
exercise according to law. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that plaintiff should be and he hereby is 
entitled to nominal damages from defendant in the sum 
of $1.00 for his wrongful expulsion by defendant from 
the partnership business and that plaintiff is entitled to 
his costs in this action. 
Dated this 25th day of June, 1956. 
(S) CHARLES G. COWLEY 
Judge 
STATE:MENT OF POINTS 
The evidence is insufficient to support: 
Finding #1, that portion which says "April 30, 1955 
on which said date defendant wrongfully and without 
cause 'expelled plaintiff from partnership business"; 
Finding #2, and was was wrong in amending said 
finding. That the amended finding is ambiguous and 
uncertain; 
Finding #3, the whole thereof; 
Finding #5, that portion which says "there was no 
agreement for defendant to receive 'extra money"; 
Finding #6, wherein it says that plaintiff worked 
sufficient hours to transact partnership business norm-
ally, took a reasonable amount of time off as vacation, 
that plaintiff did not refuse to bag meal or work in 'ex-
cess of 8 hours ; 
Finding #7, the whole thereof. 
Finding #8, that portion that says (defendant) "on 
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or about the 20th of April, 1955 misappropriated a 
check for $1,731.60; That on April 30, 1955 defendant 
wrongfully expelled plaintiff from partnership busi-
ness"; 
Finding #9, the whole thereof; 
Finding #10, the whole thereof; 
Finding #11, if it is meant that $35,000.00 was only 
a passing fancy then it is unsupported by the evidence, 
the sum of $31,381.00 is incorrect it should be $30,461.00; 
Finding #12, and the whole thereof is unsupported 
by the ·evidence ; 
Finding #13, is contrary to evidence and law of case; 
Finding #14, and the whole thereof· is not supported 
by the evidence or law in the case; 
Finding #15, as to damages is not supported by the 
evidence in the case ; 
That the court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial; 
That the court erred in appointing as attorney for 
receiver one whose firm was attorney for intervenors 
and attorn'ey for Brewer Tire Co. in a civil action filed 
against the defendant and Ogden Alf~fa Mills; 
The court erred in refusing to let defendant question 
plaintiff as to his solvency. 
That the court erred in not ordering the discharge 
of the receiver upon the defendant filing a supersedeas 
bond. 
That the court erred in not decreeing that the part-
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nership existing between the defendant and the plain-
tiff terminated April 30, 1955. 
ARGUMENT 
It is well to eonsider first of all just what weight should 
be given the plaintiff's, Donal Ferrin, testimony. In the 
fir.st place there is no question about his failure to keep 
books as required of him; then he has wilfully failed and 
refus€d to assist · inj · I{endering 1an accounting; he has 
l 
clearly demonstrated that the only thing he was inter-
ested in was money; but the greatest indication of plain-
tiff's unreliability may be taken from his testimony, 
to-wit: On direct examination he testified, that he had in-
vested $700.00, $800.00 and $180.00 in the business. On 
cross examination he was forced to admit that the $700.00 
and $800.00 items were checks for amount due for over 
payment of income taxes and that he had paid his income 
taxes with company checks, so the money belonged to 
the company; The $180.00, he could find no record of 
it in any of the company records so he had to abandon it. 
Again he testified that he had in March 1955 bought a 
garden tractor and charged it to the company without 
knowledge of his partner and on cross examination, he 
admitted that he had obtained a company gasoline credit 
card .and during the month of May 1955 had charged 
$37.79 gasoline, etc., but plaintiff said it was used to buy 
gasoline for his traveling between Eden and Ogden, in-
ferring it was company expense; asked if he hadn't taken 
a trip to Colorado he said no. But when he was con-
fronted with gasoline slip showing purchases in Moab 
and other places plaintiff admitted he made the pur-
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chases there. 
Could he have been any more honest in other matters 
that concerned him than he was in these. A look at the 
record of his testimony will show that the plaintiff either 
stalled, made evasive answers or didn't answer at all 
where he was concerned. That also applies to A.M. Fer-
rin's testimony. The!'e was an elderly gentleman, who 
never used a 'single entry' or a 'double entry' bookkeeping 
system but an 'occasional entry' system and from his 
memory tried to supply the details to his sketchy entries. 
Another circumstance : in one place they deny that A. M. 
Ferrin was Donal's agent and in another they both say 
that A. M. was Donal's agent in negotiating the partner-
ship .agreement. 
On May 1, 1955 to determine what Clyde owed Donal 
these questions had to be answered: 
1. How much did the partnership owe A. :JI. and 
Leonard Ferrin, settled by stipulation $10,000.00. 
2. The fair market value of the business! Stipulated 
$35,000.00. 
3. Value of Clyde's beginning capital investmenU 
4. Extra money for Inanageinent, overtime and 
bagging, if any~ 
5. The amount of withdrawals each had n1ade and 
how they should be credited? 
The last three questions were subject to controversy 
because the plaintiff had failed to do his ao-reed dutY of b • 
bookkeeping and he also breached his fiduciary relation-
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ship by making false entries and delivering false in-
formation to Mr. Wangsgard, their accountant. Before 
June 13, 1955 plaintiff n'ever denied that Clyde had 
right to extra pay for bagging. On about May 5, 1955 
plaintiff and his attorney, I. Gordon Huggins, met with 
Clyde and Clyde's wife in defendant's counsel's office. 
After a few minutes of bickering plaintiff said 'I'm leav-
ing' and walked over to defendant's counsel and said 
in substance: "Clyde can have $30.00 per month for 
bagging but I won't stand for overtime or the amount 
of beginning inventory, the old stuff wasn't worth that 
much." Even when plaintiff made out his complaint he 
alleged that defendant had withdrawn about $5,000.00 
in excess of plaintiff which he claimed was for over-
time. It was after June 13th that he first objected to 
extra for bagging. Even on the stand at the trial he 
admitted Clyde was paid extra for bagging in 1947. 
A. M. Ferrin testified, on page 94 of transcript 144-B: 
A. "And that Clyde wanted pay for managing. 
You want to know what I told him~ I would 
start giving you fifty dollars a month to keep 
notes on the business and pay fifty a month 
to manage." 
Q. "In the old partnership~" 
A. "In the New." 
When the defendant notified the plaintiff on April 
15, 1955 that he was dissolving the partnership on April 
30, 1955, and on that date the defendant would pay the 
plaintiff the fair market value of his share in the assets 
of the partnership busines,s, the defendant had a legal 
right to do so even if the plaintiff had not acquiesced 
in it, (a) by w.alking away from the business; (b) sub-
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mitting his price offer; and (c) and by accepting $400.00 
as an advance payment all before April 30, 1955. 
The law is set forth in 68 C.J.S. 333 (a) The effect 
of notice: "the notice of dissolution may, however, speci-
fy a date in the future at which the dissolution will be-
come effective and in such a case the partnership is dis-
solved on the day stated," see also 47 C.J. 109 note 38 
and case cited thereunder. 
In Nuland v. Pruyn, 222 P2nd 261, the California 
Court held if the partnership was by notice rightfully 
dissolved by defendant, plaintiffs would be entitled to 
have their ownership in assets determined as of the 
date of dissolution .and to have payment made to them in 
money. 
The plaintiff failed to do his required duty of setting 
up books in January 1948 and setting forth the original 
capital investments, agreement as to extra pay, if any, 
and the beginning liabilities and see that they were cor-
rectly kept thereafter. '·E,Tery presumption of law is 
against the partner who should have kept the firm books 
and did not do so" 47 C.J. 1167 § 855; Thornas v. Win-
chester Bank, (1\::y.) 49 8.\Y. 539. 
The plaintiff says he furnished :Jir. W angsgard with 
.all the infonnation during the ti1ne he was with the part-
nership, that with the further fact it was his duty to keep 
the books precludes the plaintiff fro1u denying the cor-
n~etness of 1\[r. \Vangsgard's entry that Clyde's begin-
ning inventory was $9,080.98, R 144 B 1~. 
With a knowledge of aeeounting plaintiff had gained 
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by studying accounting in college for two years he knew 
e:x.actly how he could manipulate the accounts to his own 
advantage and to the injury of his partner by falsely 
entering his own withdrawals as operating expenses of 
the business and by crediting Clyde's wages, as extra 
money, to Clyde's withdrawals instead of as business 
operating expenses. These things were wilfully and 
wrongfully done by the plaintiff and it is axiomatic that 
a court of equity will not allow a wrong doer to un-
justly enrich him.self by his wrongful acts. In an early 
Utah case, decided by the Territorial Supreme Court, 
9U 236, P. 1039, and then appealed to the U. S. Supreme 
Court, 168 U.S. 328, 18 S. Ct. 135; the court said a court 
of equity will not appoint a receiver for a wrong doing 
partner or allow him to take advantage of his wrongful 
acts. 
The plaintiff prevented and delayed an accounting 
being made by refusing to cooperate with the defendant 
and the auditor. . Plaintiff knew that his failure to co-
operate would prevent the accounting being correct be-
cause of his false entries, that could only be cured by him. 
In 68 CJS p 900 §387, Valuation of assets: The 
amount for which the partners is liable who takes exclu-
sive possession of the firm stock on dissolution is gen-
erally its fair value on date of dissolution. Gunnell v. 
Bird (D.C.) 19 L Ed 993; 47 CJ 1167 n 84; Frass v. 
Frass, 131 A 276; Vogt v. Lee (Tex) 32 SW 2nd 688. 
Even if plaintiff had not agreed to the sale of his share 
to defendant the defendant would nort be liable for dam-
ages. 
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I call your attention to the fact that the plaintiff, 
by the testimony of Doris, George and Clyde Ferrin, 
would walk off the job w~thout notice, refuse to work 
overtime and refused to assume responsibility and this 
same eonduct carried over when he was working under 
orders of the Court. In the first instance he left the 
job because he had to see his lawyer, R 144 A 22, and 
under the receiver he first walked off the job one time 
at about 11 A.M. and went to get his check from the 
receiver, R Sup. 42, 38, and the other time he just quit 
.at 3 or 4 P.M. He also refused to work Saturday after-
noons and overtime because he said Clyde could hire 
extra help. Then he refused to sign checks for Clyde's 
overtime and make proper book entries. In face of all 
that defendant had ample cause to dissolve the partner-
ship. 
The foregoing proves the error of that portion of 
court's Finding #1 which says: " ... April 30, 1955, 
on which said date defendant wrongfully and without 
cause expelled plaintiff fron1 such partnership business." 
and the error in any other Finding or Conclusion that 
make:s the same statement. 
On about April 18, 1955, John A. Hendricks re-
ceived a letter frmn I. Gordon Huggins dated April 
28, which stated in part: 
"My client Donal Ferrin, his father Arthur ~I. 
Ferri~, a~d brother, Leonard Ferrin, spent this 
morning In 1ny office going oYer the details of 
the Ogden Alfalfa ~!ills business - - - - - - - -
'The father and Leonard have requested n1e to 
represent then1 in this action also.· - - - - - If Clyde 
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does not want to sell, the following sums must 
be paid them to father and Leonard for th'eir 
share $11,200.00 with interest' - - - - - - - - 'Don 
must realize the sum of $16,200.00' - - - - - - -
I have also been instructed to request that Don 
be allowed at least $350.00 immediately for living 
expenses as he has absolutely no access at present 
time to any monies due and owing him for the 
partnership.------ " signed I. Gordon Huggins 
On April 29, 1955, .plaintiff called at the Mill and 
he was given a check for $400.00 which he cashed. From 
the foregoing it is evident that the partnership was 
lawfully dissolved April 30, 1955. Nor was the plain-
tiff wrongfully expelled from the business without cause. 
FINDING #2: The original finding, to which the 
defendant strenuously objected, which objection was 
overruled by the Court June 25, was absolutely contra 
to evidence, Plaintiff's Exhibit A, the price is wrong 
and assets of the old partnership were not taken over 
by the new partnership. This was judicial error and 
could not be corrected after notice of appeal except on 
appeal. 
As to the am'ended Finding of Fact #2, that was 
signed and approved by the Court over the strenuous 
objection of the defendant on August 23, 1956. This 
was also judicial error. But assuming, for the purposes 
of argument only, that the Court had a right to correct 
its error, the new finding, R 110, errs in this: That it 
incorrectly described the property leased by the old 
partnership it leaves out the equipment, trucks and 
etc. 
It incorrectly describes the property purchased by 
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the new partnership. It incorrectly stated that the old 
partnership terminated January 1, 1948, when it was 
terminated December 31, 1947. 
The new. #2 Finding further states " .., - - the old 
partnership was terminated as of that date (January 
1, 1948) and that certain assets were turned over to 
the new partnership composed of plaintiff and defend-
ant." This is erron·eous because it is ambiguous and 
cannot be determined therefrom what assets, nor by 
whom. And that information is very essential. 
AS TO FINDING #3. It says: "that the defendant 
is entitled to a beginning inventory and he did contrib-
ute to said busin'ess a total of cash and equipment in 
the sum of $6,000.00 - - - - - - be composed as follows: 
an original cash investment of $3,804.29, with additional 
cash investment later of $665.00 and $350.00 -, making 
$4,819.29 and equipment of a reasonable value of 
$1,180. 71." 
"The court further finds the bear cat chopper is 
the personal property of Clyde and the other items are 
overvalued." 
I'll take up this finding in segments because it will 
simplify the argument. Clyde claimed a beginning in-
ventory of $9,080.98. The a1nount of $3,804.29 is er-
roneous on its face and was supported only by Donal's 
testimony that he saw those figures on. a paper n1ade 
out by his father, ·which was objected to and on the. 
testimony of Father Ferrin that those were figures he 
arrived at and they must be true, and no one had ever 
objected to them. To the qu'estion "Would it have done 
them any good to object to them'?'' Answer "No it 
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wouldn't." R 144-B 185. A. M. Ferrin further stated 
that some where he had figured out the profits due Clyde 
from the old partn'ership for 1946 and 1947. Father 
Ferrin identified Defendant's Exhibit 10 as made by 
him in arriving at Clyde's cash value as $3804.29. It 
was pointed out to Mr. Ferrin that he had in Clyde's 
one check for $127.50 which he had written on the 
stub for overtim·e and another check #1189 dated J anu-
ary 5, 1948 for $300.00 which would be out of the new 
partnership and charged to Clyde as a withdrawal from 
the new partnership and Clyde testified that included 
in those checks were his claim of $726.00 for overtime 
and bagging, so his father's figures just couldn't be right. 
There is no getting away from these figures: 
Cash shown to be in the bank Jan. 1, 1948- Def. Exh. 8 $ 9,030.01 
Hay and meal - according to Father F·errin -------------------- 7,963.00 
$16,993.01 
This belonged ($16,993.01) to Father, Leonard, George 
and defendant, Clyde. 
Father Ferrin testined, R 144-B 171, that he and 
Leonard took everything out of the old partnership 
that they had coming except $9,000.00 which they loaned 
to the new partnership. 
When W angsgard set up the books June 28, 1948, 
he entered $680.00 as due George Ferrin but Clyde said 
he was quite sure George loaned them $1,204.00, so 
taking those figures this is what we get: 
Beginning inventory ----------·---------···········----· $16,993.01 
A. M. and Leonard Ferrin loan ................ 9,000.00 
$ 7,993.01 
George Ferrin loan (Clyde's testimony) .... 1,204.00 
This had to be Clyde's .................................... $ 6,789.01 
Clyde listed as his equipment Ford Semi .............. $ 1,500.00 
Mr. Wangsgard set up these in- Ford 1 liz Ton ........ 700.00 
ventory values for tax purposes Bear cat chopper .... 1,000.00 
Bale loader ............ 300.00 
Trailer wagon ........ 1,500.00 
'$ 5,000.00 
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Again defendant calls your attention to the fact 
that defendant, Clyde Ferrin, took plaintiff into th~ 
partnership against his will for no consideration ftom 
plaintiff nor without the investment of a single cent. 
Certainly under thos'e circumstances defendant had a 
right to say whether ·the Bear-cat chopper was to be 
included in the business just as much as the hay, tools, 
bale loader or cash that· he contributed. Defendant· said 
he considered the chopper necessary as standby equip-
ment and George sustained him in that. Therefore, 
the court arbitrarily ruled the chopper out. 
"as to the two $1,500.00 items, (a Ford semi and 
Trailer wagon) claimed by the defendant, they were 
primarily a gift. to the new partnership and that the 
defendant is entitled to only % interest in each item 
as· credit in his beginning inventory, and further that 
the alleged value of such 'items are over valued and 
that $3,000.00 alleged value of the bale loader and the 
$700.00 value of the old truck are likewise over valued." 
In criticism of this segment of the finding,, will state 
there was no competent evidence that the value of those 
two $1,500.00 items were less than listed, nor is there 
any reason to believe that Clyde did not have the right 
to list them in his beginning inventory at that pric'e, 
that price was listing· for taxing purposes and ~ 
the 7 years and 4 months 10% was used by the· firm 
for depreciation amounting to $2,200.00 giving them a 
present value of $800.00. Again the statemei~t •'entitled 
to only 1.4 their value" is obvious error because there 
was only Father Ferrin who testified he gave l1is share 
to the new company. Leonard did not so testify and 
George testified that he sold all his interest in the old 
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partnership equipm'ent to Clyde e~cept as to the trailer 
wagon and Clyde sold him his in that and Clyde testi-
fied to the same thing. Therefore, Clyde had a 1h in-
terest in those items. Then if Father Ferrin and 
L'eonard, if they had thought of it, gave their 1f2 interest 
in the items to new partnership. Clyde would be en-
titled to 1f2 of their interest which would make Clyde 
owner of 3/4 of those two items. How the court con-
sidered th'e over-valuation of each item cannot be de-
termined, therefore, it is too vague to make good find-
ing. Obviously the defendant was 'entitled to a greater 
value than $1,180.00 arbitrarily set by the court. The 
company used the depreciation on the bale loader and 
truck listed prices 7-1/3 years amounting to $733.33 
and certainly their present value exceed $266.66 their 
present book values. 
To recap: 
Defendant by cash, hay' & equipment inventory ------------ $ 9,080.98 
Defendant's share of old partnership inventory ________ 6,759.01 
Balance to be charged to equipment ---------------------------- $ 2,2;2:1.97 
For 7 1/3 years the partnership has taken an in-
come by way of depreciation on Clyde's equipment of 
$3,666.66, $733.33 of that has been taken from the Bear 
chopper and Clyde was entitled to %, of the balance 
of $2,933.33, $2,200.00 plus $733.33 is $2,933.33. Which 
is greater than the amount needed to be credited to 
Clyde's equipment. It app'ears quite obvious that the 
defendant's beginning inventory, which he told the 
defendant to take it or there would be no partnership 
formed, R 144-B 114, was plenty low. Again I repeat 
the rule which is that every presumption of law will be 
against the partner who was supposed to keep the com-
pany books and didn't. By what right does the plaintiff 
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challenge the defendant's inventory. 
Now, as to the last segment of Finding #3, to-wit: 
"The court further finds that the defendant was 
not forced or coerced into accepting plaintiff into 
the partn·ership business but rather entered into 
the partnership arrangement of his own free 
will and choice." This will be answered by 
quoting from the testimony of the plaintiff and 
his father, R 114-B 48. 
Question to plaintiff by Mr. Hendricks: 
Q. Your father refused to loan Clyde the 
$9,000.0 unless Clyde would take you 
into the business. 
A. That is correct. Yes. 
Again TB 46: 
Q. You knew Clyde did not want to take you 
into the business 1 
A. He did object to me coming in. 
Question to Father Ferrin R 144 B 92: 
Q. You refused to loan Cylde the $9,000.00 
unless he would take Donal in the part-
nership? 
A. That is right. 
R. 90 - Finding # 4 is correct. 
R. 90 - Finding # 5 ; th'e first portion is in error and 
contra to evidence - to-wit: "That there was no agree-
ment between plaintiff and defendant to pay defendant 
extra money for overtin1e or bagging or n1anagenmnt 
of said business, and that defendant is not entitled to 
such." The testimony of the defendant was that he 
was paid such extra money by the old partnership and 
it was agreed that he was to continue to do so in the 
new partnership R 144-B 153, there was introduced 
in evidence the record of check issued to Clyde by the 
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old partnership, signed by his father A. M. Ferrin, with 
the notation on the check stub that it was for overtime 
- Defendant's Exhibit 10, check # 646 for $127.50 dated 
5/7/47. Defendant and his wife Doris testified that 
they drove to Eden the first part of January, 1947 to 
his father's home and in the presence of father and 
Leonard defend~nt told them he would have to be paid 
extra if he continued to do all the bagging and that they 
agreed to pay him $30.00 a month for bagging, R 144-
B 155 and 156. This was not denied by the plaintiff. 
Obviously if he got it from the old partnership he 
would insist on getting the same from the new part-
nership. 
One paper I called A. M. Ferrin's attention to listed 
the equipment of George and Clyde used in the business 
as valued at $1200.00 and there was no record of them 
ever .having been paid for it. 
Father Ferrin kept no complete records. He relied 
on his memory and his lack of bookkeeping technique 
caused him not to give much importance as to how he 
kept the records. He said directly that Clyde never 
received extra pay for overtime but when he was con-
fronted with his notation on the check 'payment for 
overtime', he said "it must be so" R 144-B 163. The 
plaintiff was being examined, R 144-B 48, about Cylde's 
claim for $30.00 per month for. bagging, plaintiff made 
:;1; · this significant answer : 
Q. You knew that since the time the business 
started Clyde has claimed the same rate 
that he got from the old partnership of 
thirty a month 1 
A. No sir he hasn't. 
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Q. He hasn't claimed that~ 
A. Yes I think down to 4 7 it is different 
than 48. 
Momentarily plaintiff forgot himself and showed that 
he knew Clyde was paid for overtime in 194 7. 
Further down on p 48 TB : 
Q. You say Clyde (defendant) never entered 
into an agreement to be. paid for extra 
work and would divide the profits 50-50 
with you~ 
A. He didn't do all the extra work. 
If you read the record of plaintiff's cross examination 
of the plaintiff you will see how he crossed himself up 
and how he parried every question he didn't want ans-
wered or to answer would embarrass him. 
The defendant introduced two checks into evidence; 
Defendant's Exh. 3, check No. 2522, dated October 9, 
1950 for $125.00 to Clyde W. Ferrin, signed by A. ~I. 
Ferrin, on the stub of which was marked 'for work'. 
Defendant's Exh. 4, check No. 2560 for $37.19 dated 
Nov. 30, 1950 to Clyde W. Ferrin, signed by A. ~I. 
Ferrin. The notation on the check stub was 'for hauling 
hay'. These checks conclusively show that Clyde was 
paid extra for overtime work both by the old partner-
ship and the new. Plaintiff cannot now claim that he 
did not know about these two checks because it was his 
duty as bookkeeper to know and he testified R 144-B 3 & 
33. "I kept the books for 7 years and 4 months and de-
livered the information each month to !fr. Wangsgard 
our Tax accountant". Plaintiff cannot now challenge 
these checks. 
Defendant also introduced 5 checks into evidence, 
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all included in Defendant's Exh. 9 all of which were 
signed by the plaintiff, Donal Ferrin, and he knew 
at the time he signed them that they were noted on 
the check stubs as payment for extra work. 
About October 15, 1954, the defendant served notice 
on the plaintiff that hereafter the books were to cor-
rectly show his payments for overtime and extra work 
and that he was going to draw his check for overtime 
each month. as it became due and these five checks were 
in accordance with the overtime he put in. On the stubs 
of each check was a notation for what it was for. Check 
No. 254 is dated Feb. 24 is for $300.00, on the check 
stub was the notation $240.0 was for Clyde's extra work 
and $60.00 was for 2 months board for Donal. These 
checks were not included in defendant's stipulation of 
his withdrawals. 
The plaintiff asked the Court to declare them with-
drawals by the defendant and not as pay for extra 
work. The plaintiff testified that altho he signed them 
knowing that they intended them to be payment for 
bagging and extra work he did not intend to agree to 
their notation but he signed them to keep peace in the 
family and in one instance he gave rather a fantastic 
excuse that he did so his brother could get his wages 
from Cylde, R 144-B 8. Although this was stoutly denied 
by the defendant. The Court found that they were 
withdrawals, even the plaintiff's $60.00 board bill. The 
court should have made a separate finding as to that 
fact so it could be specifically attacked. The evidenc·e 
conclusively shows that it was agreed in the beginning 
that Clyde was to be paid for bagging, manage, and 
overtime R 144-B 96. Father Ferrin said "we spent 3 
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weeks trying to arrive at a conclusion for overtime." 
R 144-B 96. 
Finding No.6 repeats Finding No.4 which is a fact: 
"That both plaintiff and defendant worked suffficient 
hours to transact partnership business normally and 
both of the parties took a reasonable amount of time 
from business as vacation or time off" could only be 
found if one considered the week that the defendant 
took as his only vacation in 7 years, R 144-B 162 and 
the further fact that he put in overtime every week he 
worked as reasonable. You would have to consider the 
countless vacations plaintiff took and his frequent re-
fusal to work overtime as reasonable. 
The statement that "The court further finds that 
the plaintiff did not refuse to do any of the bagging o~ 
meal . . . but rather finds that the plaintiff agreed to 
do his share of the bagging if the defendant would do 
his share of the delivering of meal to the customers," 
is highly irrelevant because the defendant alleged and 
proved that he agreed to do the bagging and did do it 
for term of the partnership January 1, 1948 to April 
30, 1955, and he claimed he was to receive $30.00 per 
month extra pay for doing it. After the plaintiff re-
ported for work from July on in 1955 he· refused to 
do any bagging of meal when requested to do so by 
the defendant and at the Nov. ~1, '33 hearing gave as 
his excuse for not obeying orders that he wouldn•t bag 
because the defendant wouldn't agree to deliver one-
half the time. 
As to Finding # 7 - heretofore it has been shown 
the plaintiff violated the partnership agreen1ent by fail-
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ing to keep books and by making false entries in the 
books and delivering false information to Mr. Wangs-
gard their Tax accountant. And that he would walk 
off the job without notice to defendant and frequently 
refused to work overtime when it was necessary and 
refused to assume responsibility. And never solicited 
business or tried to improve the company's business, 
RT 144-B 51-52-54-159-164. 
Q. Did you ever solicit new business or assist 
in the purchase of hay~ 
A. No that was Clyde's duties as manager. 
As to Finding # 8 - it should state: That on or 
about the 15th day of April, 1955, defendant notified 
the plaintiff that he would terminate the partnership 
on April 30, 1955 and after that date he would operate 
the business as his own and that he would pay the plain-
tiff his share of the business as of Apri] 30, 1955. 
That the plaintiff thoroughly understood that is 
borne out by the acts and acknowledgments of the plain-
tiff ever since, and on or about April 20, 1955, plaintiff 
informed the defendant that he would not work any more 
and that he would inform the defendant how much he 
would have to pay him. Plaintiff then left the mill and 
never again pres'ented himself for work. On April 28, 
1955, he had his attorney notify defendant's attorney 
that he would have to have $16,200.00 for his share of 
the company business and requested a check of at least 
$350.00 to tide him. over till the matter was settled. 
On April 29, 1955, plaintiff came to the mill and the 
defendant gave him a check for $400.00 in compliance 
with plaintiff's request. Since that time the defend-
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ant has continuously tried to get the plaintiff and inter-
venors to cooperate with him in settling their account 
and they have consistently refused to assist and have 
done their utmost to prevent an accounting, so that 
segment of Finding No. 8 is in error. 
As to that s'egment of Finding No. 8, to-wit: "That 
on or about April 20, 1955, the defendant misappropri-
ated a check belonging to the partnership made by the 
Globe A-1 Mills of Ogden, Utah, to the Ogden Alfalfa 
Mills for the sum of $1,731.60 is not supported by a 
scintilla of evidence and is contrary to the agreed facts. 
The facts are that when the plaintiff informed the de-
fendant he was through and walked out of the ~.fill 
on April 20th, in order to carry on the business and 
at the suggestion of their bank, The Bank of Utah 
applied the balance in the account to the note the part-
nership owed the bank and a new account was opened 
wherein the authorized signatures were Clyde W. and 
Doris Ferrin and thereafter the partnership business 
was transacted by checks from this account. In fact 
on April 29, 1955, the plaintiff received a check for 
$400.00 from the new account. So quite obviously that 
segment of Finding No. 8 is erroneous. 
Finding # 9 is entirely erroneous by -reason of the 
fact that the defendant has continuously since April 
30, 1955, tried to get the plaintiff to cooperate with him 
in arriving at an accounting but plaintiff refused to do 
so. Cooperation on the part of the plaintiff was abso-
lutely necessary because of his failure to keep the cmn-
pany books and because of the false information the 
plaintiff furnished 1\Ir. W angsgard their tax accountant. 
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Plaintiff moved from his room in the partnership 
home of his own violition R 144-B 162 and he kept his 
things locked in said room until June, 1955. 
Finding # 10 is not only erroneous but ridiculous. 
The plaintiff sued the defendant asking for an account-
ing so that he could receive the value of his share of 
the partnership business. Defendant is not an account-
ant and the plaintiff knew that the company books and 
records were filled with false entries and information 
furnished by the plaintiff. The only way defendant 
could make an accounting was to engage a qualified ac-
countant to make the necessary adjustments to the 
books present irregularities. So he engaged the firm 
of Bunker & Tanner to do the work, with the consent 
and knowledge of the plaintiff and Father and Leonard. 
Defendant delivered all the company's books and rec-
ords of the partnership to the firm and cooperated with 
the auditors in every way possible while the plaintiff 
and intervenors refused to cooperate in any way what-
soever. 
Defendant's Exh. No. 7 Auditor's Report and Def. 
Exh. 7, 5 and 6 is a full accounting of the partnership 
business from January 1, 1948, to April 30, 1955, offered 
as such by the defendant. There is some error in it by 
reason of the fact that the plaintiff refused to cooper-
ate, had he joined with the defendant in ascertaining 
the checks made out to other persons when they should-
have been correctly charged, rather than wrongfully 
charged to business expense. The amount of the checks 
made out to the partners in their own names as shown 
by the books were ascertained by the auditor and are 
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not challenged by the defendant, to-wit: 
Stipulated drawing of Clyde _________ " ________ , _________ $30,461.00 
Def. Exh. 7, p. 3 _actual drawings by __________ 29,102.23 
Clyde the $920.00, Def. Exh. No. 9, were______ 1,338.77 
in Clyde's name but were decreed by 
the court not to be wages. 
Stipulated drawings by DonaL---------------------~$27,829.69 
Def. Exh. 7, p. 3-actual drawings per 
books Don ---------------------------------------------------------- 22,121.41 
$ 5,708.28 
Don wrote checks to his creditors that 
. totaled $5,708.28 which he wrongfully 
reported to Mr. W angsgard as business 
expense. 
Of course, the partners stipulation for withdrawals 
does not take into consideration the depreciation adjust-
ment made by the Internal Revenue agents as the 
auditor did. Page 3 of Defendant's Exh. 7 would have 
been made perfect as far as the partnership books and 
records are concerned except as to Clyde's claim for 
extra money and beginning inventory if the plaintiff had 
cooperated. Had the plaintiff cooperated page 4 
would undoubtedly have been shown in 2 pages, one 
showing the partners capital accounts based on Clyde's 
claims for extra wages and capital investment and, one 
according to plaintiff, Donal's claims. 
The only errors in the company records and the 
audit are due to the neglect of the plaintiff to perform 
his duties, his wilfully and wrongfully making false 
entries in the books, delivering that false information 
to W angsgard, their tax accountant. What court of 
equity will allow a wrong doer to gain an advantage 
by reason of his wrong doing. The fact re1uains that 
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the court could have taken Defendant's Exh. 7 and 
called in the auditor and had him make the adjustments 
in accordance with the court decree. Are we to discard 
this auditor who has been paid over $500.00 and hire 
another auditor to do this expensive work all over 
again~ Will a court of equity let a wrong doer forever 
cause an innocent partner trouble and expense. 
Finding of fact #11: Is erroneous in this, the de-
fendant did not stipulate that his withdrawals amounted 
to $31,381.00. The need of the stipulation between Clyde 
and Donal was necessary because Donal, as bookkeeper, 
had made out a large number of checks to his creditors 
and entered the amounts on the check stubs as business 
expense and therefore could not be identified by a 
stranger. Also some checks were made out to Clyde's 
creditors. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for 
Donal to cooperate so the checks and their total amounts 
could be found so the correct adjustment can be made. 
The stipulation was to the total sum of those checks in 
excess was what the books and records revealed. 
The books showed Don's drawings amounted to 
$22,121.41 D Exh. 7 p. 3. Plaintiff and defendant stipu-
lated that Donal should be charged with an additional 
$5,708.28. The books and records showed that Clyde 
had checks issued to him in the sum of $29,102.23. De-
fendant stipulated that there were additional checks 
issued to other people that should be charged to his 
account in the total sum of $1,358.77. The defendant 
had introduced 5 checks, as Def. Exh. 9, all of which 
were in Clyde's or his wife's name which entries on their 
stubs noted they were for extra work except one which 
the stub :entry showed $60.00 of it was for Donal's board, 
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their total amount was $920.00 and these checks were 
signed by the plaintiff knowing what they were for. 
Plaintiff moved the court that the $920.00 be credited 
to Clyde as withdrawals and -not charged as company 
expense. The court granted the motion. There should 
have been a separate finding by the Court to that effect. 
FINDING #12. That defendant is in con-
tempt of court for failure to obey a valid order 
heretofore made by the Honorable P.arley E. Nor-
seth, one of the judges of the above entitled court, 
made on or about the 21st day of November, 1955, 
and signed on the 22nd day of K ovember, 1955, in 
which said order defendant was sentenced to 30 
days in the Weber County jail and whereby the 
court· further ordered that the sentence might 
be suspended if defendant would purge himself 
of contempt of court, which said order defendant 
has refused to comply with; that defendant is to 
be granted a stay of execution of the 30 day jail 
sentence provided he complies with the decree 
of this Honorable Court except that defendant 
may exercise his righfs to appeal according to 
law. 
If the entry of a judgment be so obscure as 
not to express the final determination of the 
court with sufficient accur.acy, reference may, 
and indeed ought to be had to the pleadings, and 
the entire record, when construing the judgment. 
Freeman on judgments, Sec. -!5, and cases cited 
therein. 
In the belief that neither Finding of Fact #12 nor 
the Conclusions of Law #5 nor the corresponding para-
graph in the decree expresses the final determination 
wj th sufficient .accuracy to be readily interpreted. I 
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·am insetting the ord~rs, the minute entries and discus-
.~ion.s in court upon which the orders are predicated upon. 
TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL PROCEEDING TRIAL 
June 13, 1955 
DONAL FERRIN, the plaintiff, called as a 
witness on h1s own behalf and sworn. 
, MR. HENDRICKS: If it please the Court, 
·before taking up the time in questioning, I think 
that we can agree upon all the facts. Be just 
one rtiling of the Coutt. 
Now there is rio disagreement, I think, on the 
fact they entered a partnership agreement Jan-
uary 1, 1948. 
THE COURT : tet me ask this question, 
\Vh~t is the order to show cause for 1 
. MR. HENDRICKS : Well, it's a dissolving 
of the partnership. Now, prior to this time Mr. 
A. N. Ferrin had taken his three sons and they 
formed a partnership and leased the alfalfa field 
· and t4ose mills just to the west of the railroad 
. track. Two year lease With option to buy. At 
the .end of two years Mr. Ferrin and his three 
sons no longer desited to continue the business, 
so tltey dissolved the partnership, 
(Further statement by Mr. Hendricks.) 
· (Discussion off the record.) 
~n. RENDIRCKS: There was never an 
agreement as to what the div:lsion of profits 
shouid be. Both s1des admit that. Mr. Clyde 
Ferrin had $9;000.00 invested in :Lt, the plaintiff 
didn't hav~ anything at all, and there was con-
tinual biekering over the partnership. Fin.ally in 
April of 1955 the plaintiff refused to sign checks 
and the·y concluded that-'-My client concluded it 
was impossible to do business any long·er with 
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the plaintiff, .so he declared that the partnership 
was through and he would buy out the other 
fellow's interest, what interest he had. Now if 
there is any disagreement with these f.acts-The 
plaintiff walked out of the business about April 
20th, and then they argued back and forth about 
what their different amounts were. 
The defendant set up a checking account 
in his name alone, doing business .as the Alfalfa 
Mills. Their business consists of grinding this 
alfalfa, and selling it principally to the two big 
mills here, makingit up into feed. They couldn't 
negotiate, and plaintiff walked out finally. He's 
never been back on the premises since about April 
-Between April 20th and :\lay 1st. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. HENDRICKS: Now he has come in 
here and asked that an injunction be granted for, 
or the defendant restrained from disposing of 
the partnership property. \Yell, there's no prop-
erty except in the conduct of the business. There 
i.s no property in the partnership-physical prop-
erty-except eight acres, or six acres of land, 
the mill building, tool building, gar.age and the 
house. They're fixed there, and they're in the 
names of both individuals, s ohe can't dispose of 
that, and it would be a bigger detrin1ent to him 
than to the plaintiff if he did dispose of it. He's 
conducting the business right along, and he has 
conducted it, and our contention will be that the 
partner.ship w.as dissolved as of ~\.pril 30th. 
With the consent of both sides the firm of 
Bunker & Tanner have started an audit of the 
books, which they tell n1e \Yill not take them yery 
long to c01nplete. At the end of that audit we'll 
be in a position to detennine the profits that have 
accrued to the partnership, and on the property 
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to be settled, except that we have a contest or 
disagreement as to the amount that was owed to 
A. N. Ferrin, the father; and Leonard Ferrin, 
one of the sons. 
Those are the facts I think none of us dis-
agree on. 
Now we don't think that there is any use of 
appointing a receiver. That would just be an 
extra expense. 
THE COURT: Why would a receiver be 
necessary, Mr. Huggins~ 
MR. HUGGINS: Well, Your Honor, the busi-
ness is not insolvent, but under our pleadings-
and the facts -that we feel that we're able to prove 
-C.-there has been a wrongful dissolving of the 
partnership, and we feel that .a receiver should 
be· appointed to protect the interest that the plain-
tiff has in this. partnership. Now it's possible 
to run the business into the ground, Your Honor. 
Take all the money out of it. It's also believed 
at the present time that my client i.s entitled 
to the same share of profits that he's been dr.aw-
ing in the past, and we're alleging in our order 
tp show cause that he is receiving no money. 
For his protection I don't think there is any 
question about a receiver being appointed, Your 
Honor, and I have the law to back it up. 
MR. HENDRICKS: The only thing there 
is no profits that can be disposed of. It'~ property. 
What cash there is in the bank, they owe the bank 
more than there is cash in the bank. 
(Argument.) 
MR. HENDRICKS: We say a receivership 
would be an unnecessary expense. The physical 
asset.s · are there, and the defendant's share in 
those is more than enough to protect the plain-
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tiff in any share that he may have. 
Then of course we're going to allege that 
the partnership ended in April. 
(Dis1cussion off the record.) 
MR. HENDRICKS: Both of us agree that 
the partnership should be dissolved. There is 
not que.stion there. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HUGGINS: Well, that's the intent of 
the plaintiff, Your Honor. To dissolve the part-
nership and have the business disposed of, and 
the profits accounted for. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: Well, I'll continue the matter 
one week, and you two fellows get together and 
see if you can't reduce this to some kind of for-
mula which is agreeable between the two. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: I agree there should be a 
dissolution of the partnership. 
I'm not in accord with the receivership at 
this time, Mr. Huggins, because I don't think · 
it's timely, and I think it would be detrimental 
because of the extra expense involved, which 
would necessitate the outlay of a lot of fees which 
probably can be saved for these brothers. They 
ought to be brothers enough to get together on 
some of these things and agree. 
Now as far as giving this man any salary 
at this time, I won't. That will be a n1atter he'll 
have to prove his entitled to under the partner-
ship agreement. 
MR. HUGGINS: Your Honor. theY have ad-
mitted a partnership, and adnritted ther'e has been 
no agreement as to the division of the profits. 
Under our law if there is no agreement it's 50-
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50. In the meantime the defendant has the con-
trol of the property. The defendant is receiving 
money which amounts to between $80,000.00 and 
$120,000.00 a year. As the record will show, he'13 
taking living expenses out of it, and my client 
has none. 
THE COURT: If they want a receivership 
by reason of their own cussednes.s and contr:ari-
ness they can certainly get one, if that's what 
they want. 
Now, I'd suggest to you people that you 
start talking like brothers should, instead of doing 
what you're doing, and maybe we can solve this 
trouble. 
I'm going to continue this one week. 
MR. HUGGINS: No ruling on any money 
for my client to live on~ 
THE COURT: Not today. I think he'll live. 
MR. HENDRICKS: May we .a;sk at this 
time, if Mr. Huggins' clients have any books or 
records that pertain to the partnership, they de-
liver them to Bunker & Tanner~ 
MR. HUGGINS: We'll be more than happy 
to comply, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
OF' JUNE 13, 1955 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AN DDECREED that defendant be and he is 
hereby restrained from disposing of or encum-
bering in any manner any of the partnership 
property, including cash moneys other than in 
the normal course of business. 
ITISFURTHERORDERED,ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that this motion and order to 
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show cause be continued for a period of two 
weeks to be heard again on the 27th day of June, 
1955, at 2 :00 p.m. unless the parties have stipu-
lated as to these matters. 
Dated this 17th day of June, 1955 .. 
/s/ P.arley E. Norseth 
Judge. 
Minute Ordered Entered June 13, 1955 by P. E. 
Norseth, J. 
Order to show cause came on for hearing, 
I. Gordon Huggins, Esq., appearing as counsel 
for plaintiff, John A. Hendricks, Esq., appearing 
as. counsel for defendant. 
Donal Ferrin sworn but did not testify. 
Argued. The cause being submitted, plain-
tiff restrained from disposing of any of the 
products. 
Hearing continued to June 27, 1955 at 2 :00 
P.M. 
P.E.N. 
It will be seen that on June 13, 1955, hearing on 
order to show cause before Judge N orseth that no evi-
dence wa_s introduced. Defendant's counsel made a state-
ment of facts that he thought plaintiff would stipulate 
but he did not. The minute entry says: "Defendant re-
strained from disposing of products" it should have 
read "property." Plaintiff's counsel added on about 
defendant being restrained from spending money. Tran-
script .shows that on June 13th the Court rather agreed 
to defendant's theory that the question of when the 
partnership should be dissolved was a question to be 
decided .at the trial on its merits, and the defendant re-
quested it be continued until the auditors had completed 
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their audit so an accounting could be rendered. Any 
books or records within the custody or knowledge of 
the plaintiff and intervenors was requested. 
We will now take a look at what went on at the 
hearing July 18, 1955: Judge Norseth was about to leave 
on his vacation and I surmise he thought he could shame 
the parties into a compromise. 
MINUTE ENTRY ORDER 
July 18, 1955 
Plaintiff's order to show cause and re.strain-
ing order came on for hearing, I. Gordon Huggins, 
Esq., appearing as counsel for plaintiff, and John 
A. Hendricks, Esq., appearing as counsel for 
defendant. 
The case being submitted, plaintiff waived 
the appointment of a receiver, upon the stipu-
lation of the parties through their counsel; That 
the partie.s resume working together as partners; 
that the plaintiff shall work with the defendant 
at the place of business and receive $1.50 per hour 
for his work. The defendant is to manage said 
business; plaintiff is restrained from interfering 
with defendant in the management of said busi-
ness. Thi.s arrangement shall be in force until 
the cause is heard upon its merits. P. E. N. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
This order having come on regularly for 
hearing on the 18th day of July, 1955, in Dep.art-
ment No. 3 of the above entitled court, the Honor-
able Parley E. N orseth, one of the judges of said 
court, presiding and sitting without a jury, and 
plaintiff being personally present in court and 
represented by his attorney, I. Gordon Huggin.s, 
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Esq., and the defendant being personally present 
in court and represented by, his attorney, John 
A. Hendricks, Esq.; counsel for plaintiff waived 
plaintiff's rights to the appointment of a receiver 
upon the following conditions: That the parties 
resume working together as partner_s as in the 
past; that each of them have an equal controlling 
of the management and business of the partner-
ship .and that each should draw equal wage until 
the determination of this cause upon its merits; 
counsel for defendant objecting to equal rights 
of plaintiff as to the management and control of 
said business whereupon parties submitted this 
cause and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that a receiver will not be ap-
pointed at this time; that the parties hereto shall 
resume working together in the partnership busi-
ness at the hourly scale of $1.50 per hour; that 
defendant is to manage the partnership business 
but is to refrain from oppressing or lording it 
over plaintiff and that plaintiff is to refrain from 
interferring with defendant in his proper con-
trol of said partnership business. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that plaintiff furnish defend-
ant any written records in his possession or under 
his control, if any, concerning the partnership 
bu~iness. 
Dated this 21 day of July, 1955. 
/s/ PARLEY E. NORSETH. 
July 18, 1955 Transcript 
THE COURT: Now, as I understand it, at 
this time you waive your right to have a receiver 
.appointed 1 
MR. HUGGINS: ·upon the following con-
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ditions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HUGGINS: Under the circumstances 
the partnership and the rights of both partners 
would be adequately protected if both partners 
were able to continue on in a partnership hu.si-
ness-work the same number of hours, manage 
the partnership together, and draw the same pay 
-up until the time this case is heard on its merits. 
THE COURT: Now, Judge Hendricks, have 
you heard the statement of Mr. Huggins~ 
MR. HENDRICKS: Well, it ha.s been im-
possible for the two of them to work together 
before. We have no objections to him working, 
but only one should sign the checks and carry 
on the ordinary parts of the business. We want 
one person for that. We have no objection to 
him working there, and being paid for the amount 
of hours he puts in. 
THE COURT: Same rate of pay .as the-
MR. HENDRICKS: Same rate of pay as any 
other employee. We don't mind him working 
there, to he given a certain wage that is the going 
rate it pays for that class of labor. 
THE COURT: As I understand, it's the 
same wage as the other brother gets. 
MR. HENDRICKS: Well, we can put it 
on the same wage. Put it on an hourly basis. Of 
course to say they work the same amount of 
hours, Mr. Clyde Ferrin has to keep the mill in 
operation. He works long hours at times, and 
does repairing and that, and does extra work 
that this man wouldn's do sacking. 
(Discussion off the reeord.) 
MR. HUGGINS: We won't stipulate to those 
being the facts, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: I'm not saying tho.se are the 
facts. (To Donal Ferrin) Let me ask you a ques-
tion, Mr. Ferrin. Are you willing to work down 
there~ 
DONAL FERRIN: I am. 
THE COURT: How much is the rate of pay 
you think you're entitled to receive 1 
DONAL FERRIN: On an hourly basis, $1.50 
an hour. 
CLYDE FERRIN: He was offered the op-
portunity .. 
THE COURIT: (To Clyde Ferrin) Will you 
pay $1.50 per hour~ 
CLYDE FERRIN: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: (To Donal Ferrin) How 
long will you work .a day 1 
DONAL FERRIN: As many hours as nec-
essary, sir. 
THE COURT: How long do you mean by: 
"As many hours as necessary"? 
DONAL FERRIN: Sometimes it can be 
eight or, oh, sometimes ten or twelve. 
THE COURT: (To Clyde Ferrin) Mr. Fer-
rin, he says he'll work eight hours, or longer if 
necessary. ls that agreeable with you? 
CLYDE FERRIN: That's all right. Only 
he wouldn't before. 
THE COURT: \Yell, I'm not asking you that. 
CLYDE FERRIN: That's .agreeable. 
THE COUR1T: All right. 
MR. HENDRICKS: Now, Your Honor,-
THE COURT: Just a Iuinute, Judge. Who's 
going to be the boss down there? 
MR. HENDRICI{S: \V e want the-
CLYDE FERRIN: I have been managing 
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it ever since we started. 
(Argument) 
THE COURT: No wonder you two fellows 
are feuding. Spite and fight that way all the 
time, it's a wonder, you've got along as well as 
, you have. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: I'm not going to split the 
operation of the business. 
(To Donal Ferrin) As far as a boss is con-
cerned, he will be your boss if you work there. 
In other words you can't go down there and say: 
"I'm going to do it this way." Do you under-
stand that1 
DONAL FERRIN: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: (To Clyde Ferrin) And by 
the same token you're not going to lord it over 
this man, and say: "I am the boss, so you jump 
through the hoop." You treat him like you treat 
everybody else. 
CLYDE FERRIN: Yes. 
MR. HENDRICKS: There is one more-
Under the Statute 4116, any partner upon demand 
is to furnish information that he has to the other 
partner. We had an audit taken, and now Mr. 
Huggins says that they won't go by that audit, 
,so they must have other books. I'd like to ask 
Mr. Ferrin now if he has any records of that 
business that aren't down there, and haven't been 
gone over by the auditor. 
DONAL FERRIN: Not in my personal pos-
ses~ion. 
THE COURT: ('To Donal Ferrin) Do you 
know of such books in existence 1 
DONAL FERRIN: No sir. They would be 
at the mills if they are. 
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THE COURT: You don't have them1 
DONAL FERRIN: No, Sir. 
THE COURT: No one that you know has 
them, under your dire0tion ~ 
DONAL FERRIN: That's correct. 
MR. HUGGINS: We've told them that all 
the way along. 
MR. HENDRICKS: All you know is if this 
audit is based on that, that's .all the information 
you have~ Is that so~ 
MR. HUGGINS: That is not so. We do not 
intend to be _bound by those figures. 
(Argument.) 
THE COURT: Let's end this. 
(To Mr. Huggins) If you're not satisfied 
with this audit, is it your intention to hire au-
ditors~ 
MR. HUGGINS: No, Your Honor, it is not. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: If there are books and re-
cords which haven't been revealed, then I order 
each partner to reveal their books and records. 
MR. HUGGINS: I think his full and com-
plete remedy on this question is a deposition, sir. 
!THE COURT: \Yell, he probably will use 
that remedy. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: There is no necessitY for a 
bond then~ · 
MR. HENDRICK:S: No. 
MR. HUGGINS: Except for the fact my man 
ha_s no control over the business. 
THE COURT: \Yell, I appreciate that fact, 
and I suppose that is what you're fighting about. 
But I would like to suggest to you two brothers, 
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notwithstanding you're both represented by coun-
sel, if there is any way humanly possible, you 
ought to get together as brothers and settle this 
and get it out of your system. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
By reading the transcript of July 18th proceedings 
it will be seen thrut the defendant did not stipulate that 
the partnership should be reactivated, defendant merely 
agreed that he would be willing to let the plaintiff work 
there at $1.50 per hour providing he worked harmon-
iously and did not interfere with the business or its 
management. That the court agreed in the defendant's 
stand is shown in his remarks to Donal that Clyde was 
to be bos.s if Donal worked there you can't say "I am 
going to do it this way" and to Clyde "You treat like 
you treat everybody else"; also, R 144-A 10, Mr. Hug-
gins: "Except for the fact my man has no control over 
the business." Court: "Well, I appreciate tha;t fact and 
I suppose that is what you are fighting about.'' 
It takes a great deal of imagination to have the 
transcript and the minute entry conform to the order 
to .show cause composed by the plaintiff's counsel. 
There was no evidence taken at the hearing, nor can 
there be taken from defendant ·counsel's statement any 
stipulation to the effect that defendant consented to or 
waived his right to his theory that the partnership ended 
on April 30, 1955 and that all that was to be settled be-
tween plaintiff and defendant was a determination of 
the fair market value of plaintiff's share of the hu.siness 
on April 30, 1955. 
69 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The defendant strenuously objected to the order on 
order to show cause on the grounds that as written the 
order on order to show cause could be so interpreted. 
Judge Norseth went on his vacation and the arguments 
on the objection_s were heard before Judge Cowley. 
Judge Cowley listened to the argument and remarked 
"I don't believe that the order will interfere with your 
theory at the trial on its merits, and overruled defend-
ant's objections. Defendant also objected to the phrase 
"Lord it over plaintiff," as being so vague it would 
cause trouble. 
Both of defendant's fears became realities. 
On November 14, 1955 plaintiff filed an affidavit, 
R 42, wherein he stated that the defendant had converted 
large .sums of money to his own use contra to court's 
order of June 13, 1955. That defendant had refused to 
let plaintiff deliver meal and do other things he wanted 
to do. In the face of court's instructions to the plaintiff 
as to who was to be boss the charge ·was queer to say 
the least. Another was: "Plaintiff is entitled to an 
order of this court ordering defendant to refrain from 
arbitrarily regulating plaintiff's working hours and to 
refrain from unnecessarily puttering about in order to 
run up defendant's pay rate." Y e Gods, how could a 
man be manager .and boss~ ~-ill other to refrain from 
withholding $30.00 a month from his pay and asking for 
a receiver. Order to show cause was is.sued and cita-
tion to appear November 21, 1955. Defendant answered 
affidavit and order to sho·w cause, R 52. 
Hearing on order to show cause was had N oven1ber 
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21, 1955. Transcript R 144-A 11-29. 
MINUTE ORDER ENTRY Nov. 21, 1955 
This case came on for hearing at this time, 
· plaintiff present with his counsel, I. Gordon Hug-
gins, Esq., and defendant present with John A. 
Hendricks, Esq., his counsel. LeRoy B. Young, 
Esq., present representing interveners. 
Donal Ferrin sworn and testifies for plain-
tiff .. 
In plaintiff's order to show cause, counsel for 
defense contends the plaintiff has failed to co-
operate with defendant and moves the court for 
a dismissal of the action. Order to dismiss denied. 
Plaintiff cross examined. Donal Ferrin called 
on re-direct examination. Clyde W. Ferrin sworn 
and testifies for defendant. 
Clyde W. Ferrin found to be in contempt 
of court and sentenced to .serve 30 days in the 
county jail. Jail sentence suspended upon one 
condition that defendant purge himself of con-
tempt by complying with all orders heretofore 
made by the court. 
Plaintiff to receive equal salary with defend-
. ant. Plaintiff to be given equal working privi-
.leges with defendant. Defendant to make avail-
able all books and records of the Ogden Alfalf.a 
Mills forthwith. 
Pre-trial set for Wed. No. 23, 1955 at 3:00 
P.M. 
Trial date set for Jan. 6, 1956 at 10 :00 A.M. 
I. Gordon Huggins to prepare order. P. E. N. 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT. 
Upon reading and filing of plaintiff's affi-
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davit and for good cause appearing therefor, 
It is hereby ORDERED that you appear 
before the above entitled court in the courtroom 
of Department No. 3 thereof, in the Municipal 
Building, in Ogden, Utah, On Monday, the 5th 
day of December, 1955, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. 
of said day, and then and there show cause, if 
any you have, why you should not be punished 
for contempt of court for failure to obey the order 
of this court on hearings held on June 13, July 
18, and November 21, 1955. 
Failure to obey this order will be regarded 
as contempt of court. 
Let citation issue. 
Dated this 30th day of November, 1955. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
/s/ PARLEY E. NORSETH, Judge. 
This order having come on regularly for 
hearing on the 21st day of November, 1955, in 
Department No. 3 of the above entitled court, 
the Honorable Parley E. N orseth, one of the 
judges of s.aid court, presiding and sitting without 
a jury, and plaintiff being personnally present 
in court and represented by his attorney, I. 
Gordon Huggins, Esq.~ and the defendant being 
personally present in court and represented by 
his attorney John A. Hendricks. Esq .. intervenor 
Arthur I\I. Ferrin appeared in court with his 
attorney LeRoy B. Young, Esq., and both sides 
having offered testimony. the court now finds: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECHEED that defendm1t w.as and is in 
conte1npt of this court and shall be sentenced to 
30 days in the county jail, provided, however, 
72 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that said defendant n1ay purge himself of con-
tempt by complying with all of the orders here-
tofore made by this court; by paying to plaintiff 
a sum equal to that drawn by himself from the 
date of the oroginal order to this date, and paying 
to plaintiff the sums withheld to this date. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that defendant make avail-
able to plaintiff and intervenor forthwith all 
books and records of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills to 
· the date of the signing of this order and make 
available to them all future books and records 
affect~ng said business. · 
ITISFURTHERORDERED,ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that said business is not a sole 
proprietorship owned by the defendant and the 
same is still· a partnership business with full 
partnership rights in plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that plaintiff be paid ihe same 
wage or profit of said business as is drawn or 
paid to defendant and that plaintiff be permitted 
to work the same number of hours and days as 
defendant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREE Dthat defendant will continue as 
general busine.ss manager of said partnership and 
that plaintiff refrain from wrongfully interfer-
ring with the business of the Ogden Alfalfa Mills, 
and that defendant refrain from mistreating 
plaintiff as a common employee. 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 1955. 
/s/ PARLEY E. NORSETH, Judge 
November 21, 1955, Transcript 
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THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Hug-
gins. 
MR. HUGGINS: If it please the Court, this 
order to show cause is being brought today, 
brought to the attention of the Court, for the 
purpose of showing that the prior orders made 
by this Court have been openly and notoriously 
violated all the way through. 
I note in defendant's answer to affidavit 
.and order to show cause that defendant admits, 
in his paragraph No. 2, to conducting this busi-
ness as a sole enterprise, have financed it with 
their own moneys, paying all hired help. That's 
absolutely contrary to the theory of the whole 
case. In other words they feel this is their busi-
ness now, without a determination of this Court 
as to who it belongs to or who is right or wrong. 
DONAL FERRIN, the plaintiff, called as a 
witness in his own behalf and being first duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUGGINS: 
Q. Will you state your nan1e, please 1 
A. Donal Ferrin. 
Q. Where do you reside, l\Ir. Ferrin 1 
A. Layton, Utah. 
MR. HENDRICI\::8: ~-\.t this time, Your 
I-Ionor, I object to anything on this order to show 
cause, under the Statute 48130( '). It provides 
that when one has interferred with a business 
to the extent that it can no longer be conducted 
in a proper 1nanner, when he's violated the part-
nership agremnent, that the other partner may 
terminate the partnership, expel the wrong-doing 
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member, and when he does that, and complies 
with the statute by notifying all creditors, .all 
those doing business, that the partners are no 
longer in business together, then under the stat-
ute from then on he cannot bind the partnership 
business. 
(Argument.) 
MR. HUGGINS: If it please the Court, I 
feel that I should interrupt, thinking Judge Hend-
ricks is putting on evidence of his own. He's 
not under oath. He's putting evidence on that's 
definitely evidence to be submitted at the time 
of the trial. He seems to feel that his story, his 
side of the case, is law that has been passed by 
this Court. That is to be determined at the time 
of the trial. Now he as.sumes that this partnership 
was rightfully dissolved, Your Honor, but that's 
to be determined at the time of the trial and not 
by argument by counsel. 
(Argument.) 
MR. HENDRICKS All I say is if you do 
what this man wants to do now it will c.ause ir-
reparable damage. We're willing and able to 
go to trial immediately, and settle these questions 
as we allege under the law. 
(Argument.) 
THE COURT: I'm not going to dissolve 
this partnership at this time. I will hear the evi-
dence, however, on the order to show c.ause. The 
motion to dismiss is denied. Proceed. 
MR.HUGGINS: If you recall, Your Honor, 
In July you entered an orded on a previous order 
to show cause wherein you stated as follows: 
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
a receiver will not be appointed at this time; 
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that the parties hereto shall resume working to-
gether in the partnership business at the hourly 
scale of $1.50 per hour." That was for both. 
They seem to feel that plaintiff is the only one 
that gets the $1.50. 
(Argument.) 
THE COURT: Proceed, Mr. Huggins. 
Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Ferrin~ 
A. Layton, Utah. 
Q. And You're the plaintiff in this action; IS 
that co·rrect ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In your affidavit, Mr. Ferrin-You recall 
the order that I have just now read; is that 
correct~ 
A. I do. 
Q. Now has the defendant complied with that 
order~ 
A. He has not. 
Q. Would you state to the Court in what respect? 
MR. HENDRICKS: At this time I'll state 
that it was heard by Judge Cowley, and on ob-
jection Judge Cowley ruled that he was only an 
employee. 
MR. HUGGINS: Judge Cowley did not, 
Judge Hendricks. The order in the file will so 
indicate. 
THE COURT: You 1nay proceed. 
Q. What has not been c01nplied with! 
A. After the one on the 13th of June he did 
dispose of cash of the business for his own 
personal us·e. I saw that from the cheek 
books for the Inonths of l\lay, June and July. 
The second order, in August, he has held 
$187.79 fr01n 1ny checks. 
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Q. How much1 
A. $187.79. How much he has taken out I do 
see the records. 
not know, because I have not been able to 
Q. Have you asked to see the records of the 
partnership, since this action has been 
brought1 
A. Yes sir, I have, and have been denied. 
Q. Now, have you heard the defendant and his 
wife discuss certain records of the partner-
ship business 1 
A. Ye.s. 
Q. When was that 1 
A. That was, if I recall, would be in August. 
After I returned to work. After the 18th. 
It was regarding receipts for deliveries. 
Q. Where were you at the time of this conversa-
tion1 
A. I was on the lawn north of the house. 
Q. Did they know you were there 1 
A. He did not see I was there until he came out, 
after eating lunch. 
Q. Who was with you at this time 1 
A. Myself and one of the hired men. 
Q. And the defendant and his wife; is that cor-
rect~ 
A. Well, the defendant was outside. His wife 
was inside the house. 
Q. Do you know who was talking 1 
A. Clyde was talking to his wife. 
Q. Will you, state as close as you can recall, 
the words he used 1 
MR. HENDRICKS: Ju.st a minute. I ob-
ject on the grounds it's immaterial. 
THE COURT: I'll hear the answer. 
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A. The defendant told his wife to tear the yellow 
tickets from the receipt book, so it could not 
be held against them. 
Q. Now what receipt book would they be re-
ferring to~ 
A. One that is in the delivery truck. A white 
copy is given to the individual of the com-
pany to whom the load has been delivered. 
Q. And from thos& records the records of the 
partnership are made up, concerning the sale 
and purchase of feed; is that correct~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Have you been able to work the same number 
of hours the defendant has been able to work? 
A. I've been able to work, but not on certain 
afternoons and· on certain days which he 
has worked. 
Q. Have there been other persons, other than 
defendant working on those days and those 
hours~ 
A. Yes. The other hired man has worked. 
Q. So you have been re.stricted to a certain 
number of hours, while he has hired other 
people to work at the same time; is that cor-
rect~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now you say you have asked for the records 
of the business and been refused; is that 
correct~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You further allege that he has been puttering 
around and working hours to run up his rate 
of pay. Would you explain what you mean 
by that~ 
A. There would be work on the roof after we 
had stopped grinding, probably cleanup in-
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side the mill, and doing odd jobs around the 
place. 
Q. Do you know how much defendant has taken 
out of this for his own use~ The money~ 
A. I know from May 1st to August. Since then 
I do not know. 
Q. From the 1st of May to the 1st of August 
how has his wages compared with yours~ 
A. I received no money during those three 
months. 
MR. HENDRICKS: Obj·ection, on the 
grounds that at least is hearsay. 
MR. HUGGINS: I asked him to testify as 
to what he knows from the records, Judge. 
~THE COURT: I think probably, Mr. Hug-
gins, you'd better qualify him a little better. 
MR. HUGGINS: I'll strike that question, 
Your Honor, and go on to .something else. 
Q. Have you been paid back part of the money 
that you set forth in your affidavit~ 
A. The $30.00, which w.as held from my check 
up to and in eluding the first week in N ovem-
ber, I received that $30.00. last Friday. 
Q. Was that Friday the week prior to this par-
ticular date 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was after the defendant had been 
served with a citation; is that correct~ 
A. Yes. That was on the 18th that I received it. 
Q. Is it your desire to obtain the records of the 
business in order to see that your interests 
are protected~ Is that correct~ 
A. Yes, thaFs correct. And see how much he 
has been using for his own personal-
ME. HUGGINS: I believe that's all I have. 
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THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HENDRICKS: 
Q. How do you know how much he's been using? 
A. Because I saw the check book on the 1st of 
August. 
Q. What did the check book say~ 
A. He had drawn in excess of-
Q. What checks? 
A. What checks? 
Q. Yes. You name the checks. 
A. Yes sir. To Budget Finance for $1,079.00. 
One check written to Internal Revenue for 
$297.00. Check written to John A. Hendricks 
for $250.00. 
Q. For how much? 
A. $250.00. 
Q. To me~ 
A. Yes sir. Checks of $50.00 or $100.00 at a 
time to :Mr. and ~Irs. Clyde "\Y. Ferrin, total-
ling $800.00. $120 to Investors Diversified 
Services. 
Q. How did you get ahold of the check bookY 
A. When ~Ir. Admns returned the check book, 
after doing the book work for the n1onth of 
July, he left then1 on the desk in the office, 
and it was there where I saw the1n. 
Q. The check to the finance co1npany. what did 
you say the name of the finance c01npany is! 
A. Budget Finance. Frank ~I. Browning. 
Q. Do you know what that was for Y 
A. I assu1ned paying off a 19~)5 Chevrolet. 
Q. You assun1e it, but you don't know¥ 
A. Not until I see the transaction at Budget 
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Finance I don't know. 
Q. Do you know what the check that he gave 
me was for~ 
A. It was for services rendered by you. 
Q. How do you know? 
A. That's what the stub said. 
Q. All you know is what you read on the stub, 
isn't it~ 
A. Yes sir. What I saw in the check book. 
Q. What the finance company and everything 
was you don't know anything about it, do 
you? What it was for? 
A. No further than what the check book stated. 
Q. Did you see any checks there for hay? 
A. Well, there would have had to be checks for 
hay, because he had been buying hay. Th~ 
exact ones I don't recall because I wasn't 
interested in writing those down. 
Q. Now during the month of :May you went and 
bought a tractor~ After you were expelled 
from the comp:any you went and charged to 
the Alfalfa Company tractor parts, 124 dol-
lars and some-odd cents~ 
A. I charged the tractor in March of 1955. 
Q. But that had nothing to do with the business, 
did it? 
A. Well,-
Q. And they never billed the company, did they, 
until May? 
A. I think the company was billed in April. Be 
30 days, or the lOth of the month .after date 
of purchase. 
Q. And you also-
A. Be the boss, and say: "You do this and you 
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do that. You Gannot do this and you cannot 
do that." 
Q. Is that your idea of management 1 -
A. Is that my idea of .a manager1 
Q. Yes. 
A. No sir. I don't think that's a proper manager. 
Q. You don't think the manager has the right 
to tell the employees what to do 1 
MR. HUGGINS: If it please the Court, I 
object to that line of que.stioning. I think it's 
argumentative. 
(Argument.) 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
(To Reporter) What w.as the last question T 
(Question read.) 
Q. What do you consider the duties of a mana-
ger1 
MR. HUGGINS: I object to that. That'3 
argumentative. It's repetitious. He's answered. 
'THE COURT: Yes. I'll sustain the objec-
tion. 
MR. HENDRICKS: That's all. 
REDIRECT EXA~1INATION 
BY MR. HUGGINS: 
Q. Prior to the difficulty that has occasioned 
this action, Mr. Ferrin, what were your nor-
mal duties at this Ogden Alfalfa ~fills 1 
A. I delivered, I broke bales and fed bales. 
Q. Now are you still permitted to do that? 
A. No sir, I am not. 
Q. What are you not permitted to do that you 
did prior to that f 
A. I'm not permitted to deliver anymore. 
Q. Has there been any reason given for that? 
A. The onl~· reason I was given, once by Clyde 
and once by Hendricks, that Hendricks said 
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I was not to deliver. Therefore I have not 
been ·permitted to deliver. 
Q. H:as there been any other reason 1 
A. That's the only reason that I have been given. 
MR. HUGGINS: That's all I have, Your 
Honor. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HENDRICKS: 
Q. You have refused to bag, haven't you 1 
MR. HUGGINS: I object to that, Your 
Honor, it's not-
. THE COURT: I'll hear the anS>wer. 
A. I have refused to bag on the basi.s that I 
could not deliver. I have s.aid if I could de-
liver half the time I would bag half the time. 
MR. HENDRICKS: That's all. 
THE COURT: Anything else1 
MR. HUGGINS: That's all I have, Your 
Honor. 
'THE COURT: Anything else, Judge Hen-
dricks' · 
MR. HENDRICKS: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young, any questions1 
MR. YOUNG: I have none, Judge. 
(Witness excused) 
CLYDE W. FERRIN, the defendant, called as a 
witnes.s on his own behalf and being first duly sworn, 
was e:x;amined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HENDRICKS: 
Q. State your name . 
.A. Clyde W. Ferrin. 
Q. And you're the defendant in this action 1 
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A. Yes sir. 
Q. Prior to May 1st you notified all people doing 
business that thereafter you were conducting 
the business, and re;:;ponsible for all bills cre-
ated from then on~ 
MR. HUGGINS: I object to that. We're now 
on an order to show cause concerning some orders 
you had made prior to this time. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
I'd prefer, Judge Hendricks, that you confine 
your questions to -
MR. HENDRICKS: Your Honor, I'm in this 
position. You issued that order without any evi-
dence whatever. 
THE COURT: What order~ 
MR. HENDRICKS: This order that they're 
now asking this order to show cause, there isn't a 
scintilla of evidence in the case. We have one 
position and they have another. 
THE COURT: I'1n not going to try this case 
today. \\'nat I'm here for today is to determine 
whether or not this defendant is in contempt of 
this Court. That's the issue I want to try. 
(Argument) 
THE COURT: If that's your position, Judge 
Hendricks-('To ·witness) You n1ay step down, 
Mr. Ferrin. 
(Witness excused) 
MR. HENDRICK:S: ~-\t this ti1ne, anticipat-
ing what your order will be, I ask you withhold 
that until I can get a writ of prohibition from 
the Supreme Court. 
THE COURT: \Yell, you may take any steps 
you desire, Judge Hendricks, to this Court's pro-
ceeding, but until those steps are taken in the 
'b ' form prescn ed hy statute, this Court will offici-
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ate in this case. 
Mr. Young, have you anything to say~ 
MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor. I have no 
direct interest in this matter. 
THE COURT: Now I want to say this. 
You may sit down, both of you, I don't want 
to hear any argument. 
I want to say this to these parties. I have 
tried before to indicate to you men here that you 
ought to be ashamed of yourselves to be in here 
fighting about this business. Now I did not ap-
point a receivership because I thought it would be 
to your advantage not to have a receivership ap-
pointed. 
(To Clyde Ferrin) I also made an order 
directing what you should do, Mr. Ferrin-Clyde 
Ferrin. I didn't terminate this partnership. You 
haven't any right to assume you could terminate 
it from any source. This action is to determine 
where this partnership is, and who is entitled to 
participate. Neither you or anyone else have a 
right to terminate it until that matter has been 
heard, and in that regard you are in contempt of 
this Court. I told you that you could be the boss 
down there, but I also told you to treat your 
brother as you did others, and accord to him the 
same salary that you yourself had, and you have 
not done that either. Now I want you to under-
stand this. This Court doesn't have one scintilla 
of hostility to any of you people. What this Court 
has tried to do is upon the assumption that as 
brothers, sired by the same father, that you would 
get together and settle your differences. Now ap-
parently you can't do that, and I do find you in 
contempt of this Court for failing to abide with 
the Court's order. I'm going to sentence you to 
30 days in the county jail, and I'm going to sus-
85 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pend that order upon condition that you allay and 
deter and not perform .any of the duties, or con-
tinue to run the business the way you think it 
should be run upon the assumption you're the sole 
owner of this business, until that matter is adjudi-
cated. Upon the further condition that your 
brother is to be accorded the right to work the 
same hours that you work, receive the same pay, 
and be treated accordingly. 
I again make this suggestion to you fellows 
herein Court. Unless you want to ruin one an-
other, engender hatred that will never be allayed 
as long as you live, want to dis_sipate the capital 
which you now have and which has been invested 
in this business, you'd better get together and 
see if you can't solve your problems as brothers. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Huggins, you may pre-
pare that order. 
Now, I understand-~fr. Young, ~Ir. Hen-
dricks and Mr. Huggins-that the issues have all 
been joined in this case~ 
MR. HUGGIXS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll set the case for pre-trial 
this coming \Yednesday, at 3:00 o'clock p.m. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COUR'T: I'd suggest to all lawyers 
that you have your clients in Court .also. 
(DiS'cussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: I'll set this case for trial on 
Friday, January 6, 1956, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
MR. HENDRICK:S: Now. Your Honor, in 
order to clarify. You say giYe hi1n the san1e wages 
of this 1nan. Both parties were to receiYe a dollar 
.and a half an hour. There are these extra jobs 
that have to be done, like repair 1nachinery. 
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(Further statement by Mr. Hendricks.) 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: l\1:r. Huggins says he waives 
the right to a joint bank account. 
(Discus.sion off the record.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferrin is to manage the 
business. That was the order heretofore made. 
Incidentally, Judge Hendricks, Judge Cowley 
didn't modify the order that this Court had made 
before, but he did say in substance and effect that 
the prior order made by this Court remain in 
full force and effect. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: I want a record of every 
transaction that is made, and books kept so they 
can be inspected. 
MR. HUGGINS: May I have an order re-
quiring defendant to make available to us these 
records~ 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: I'll tell you what I'm going 
to do with this case. I'm going to pre-try it Wed-
nesday. If I find out that this is a matter of ac-
counting, in which records are not available, then 
I'm going to order a Master to take over your 
business and examine it from soup to nuts. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. HUGGINS: May we have availability to 
the records, Judge Norseth ~ 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(To Clyde Ferrin) Do you understand that, 
:Mr. Ferrin 1 1\Ir. Huggins is to have access to 
the books of this partnership. 
MR. HUGGINS: To date1 
THE COURT: Yes. 
87 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. YOUNG: Could that order extend to the 
creditors also? 
MR. HENDRICKS: Creditors have not right 
to these books. You two are working together to 
harass this man. 
MR. HUGGINS: I object, Your Honor, I 
think that's unfair and un-attorney like. 
MR. YOUNG: There is an issue here as to 
the amount of the debt. 
THE COURT: I understand that, ~Ir. Young. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: I want :Mr. Young and Mr. 
Huggins to have access to all the books. 
(To Mr. Huggins) You may prepare the 
order. 
(To Mr. Donal Ferrin) ~Ir. Ferrin, I don't 
want you to interfere down there, and disrupt 
business. You can't interfere \Yith customers and 
orders or anything like that. You're not to exer-
cise any jurisdietion that way. 
A. I understand, sir. 
When the order to show cause cmne on for hearing 
defendant objected to the hearing on the grounds that if 
the plaintiff's view of the order was taken the merits 
of the action would be tried at this hearing as under 
the law defendant has dissolved the partnership and had 
operated the business under that theory, financing it with 
his own 1noney and contracting all obligations in his own 
name. Plaintiff's attorney said whether the partnership 
was rightfully dissolved was to be passed on at the time 
of the trial, 1-l--l--A 13. Both state1nents were true but 
the pl~aintiff's theory that his idea was the law when he 
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was attacking defendant's theory in the court and the 
burden was on him .and therefore the defendant's theory 
was the law. 
The court said, R. 13, "I am not going to dissolve 
the partnership at thi.s time," which was correct, the 
partnership had already been dissolved according to law, 
April 30, 1955. Court denied defendant's motion to dis-
miss and allowed plaintiff to testify in regards to viola-
tion of the order of June 13, 1955 in regards to the spend-
ing of money except in the course of busines.s. That order 
obviously could only refer to money in the hands of the 
defendant April 30, 1955 together with that received 
from bills receivable at that time. Plaintiff offered no 
proof as to what that amounted to, therefor laid no 
foundation for his subsequent hearsay testimony. 
Plaintiff testified that defendant had held about 
$187.79 from his wages, he didn't know how much it was, 
but he admitted on examination that ·Clyde had paid for 
a garden tractor plaintiff had purchased in March 1955 
and charged to the partnership without Clyde's consent 
and $37.90 for gasoline plaintiff had charged to Clyde in 
~fay 1955. There was no previous order restraining the 
defendant from withholding money the plaintiff owed the 
defendant, so th.at could not be the basis of contempt. 
Then plaintiff was allowed to tell a fantastic .story 
about a conversation he heard between defendant and his 
wife about tearing yellow tickets from a book. He never 
saw a book from which yellow tickets were torn, so that 
was specul·ative and so could not be used as a basis for 
contempt. 
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Then the most insincere of all: plaintiff testified 
that the defendant mended the roof after they had closed 
down the mill, cleaned the inside of the mill and did other 
odd jobs. Under the wildest stretch of one's imagination 
how could fixing .a roof after the mill had closed, instead 
of stopping the mill or its crew of men; cleaning the mill 
after the day's work so it could start the next morning 
and doing odd jobs, that apparently needed to be done, 
be the basis for contempt. 
The plaintiff said that when Mr. Adams, the book-
keeper, returned the business records after having enter-
ed the July information in his books, he left them in the 
office and while the records were there plaintiff exam-
ined only the check book and looked only at a few of the 
check stubs and he couldn't tell what those checks were 
for, he couldn't even presume what some were, what 
valid order did the defendant violate by reason of the 
plaintiff's testimony that would make him guilty of con-
tempt of court. Plaintiff made the inane charge that 
m•an, Clyde hired, their brother, to deliver didn't have !1 
chauffeur's license; that he the plaintiff would not bag 
because Clyde wouldn't deliver half the time or in other 
words pl1aintiff refused to obey orders. 
The defendant took the stand to testify in his own 
defense and after answering one question defendant's 
counsel stated that under his instructions the defendant 
had operated the busine.ss as his own since April 30, 1955 
and he thought his client had the right to do so until the 
court decided otherwise after taking evidence on the 
merits of the case. The Judge beca1ne angry and said: 
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"if that is your position then I will not allow the defend-
ant to testify." The court told the defendant to leave 
the witness chair. The defendant was prepared to testify 
he had a right to use any moneys he had in his checking 
account. That he had borrowed $2500.00 from a finance 
company on July 7, 1955 by pledging his ear and other 
security, that he had borrowed $5,000.00 on September 
10, 1955 from the Globe Mills and had borrowed $1,400.00 
from the Seaboard Finance Co. on October 10, 1955, all 
to finance himself and the business. Defendant was pre-
pared to testify that the plaintiff refused to obey order~, 
claimed the right to pick his jobs and would walk off the 
job during working hours and not come back until the 
next day. Of course, all of that was admitted by the 
plaintiff on cross examination. 
The court being sorely provoked at defendant's 
counsel proceeded to lecture the defendant and the 
Court said "Neither you nor anyone else has a right to 
terminate the partnership until the matter has been 
heard, and in that regard you are in contempt", R. 144-
A. 26. Certainly that was a mistatement of the law, 
surely not ground for contempt of any court order. 
Again the court said, "I told you to treat your 
brother ,as you did others, and accord him the same salary 
that you yourself had and you haven't done either." The 
order of July 18, 1955 had ordered Clyde to pay the 
plaintiff $1.50 per hour and ,allow him to work 8 hours 
or more if necessary. The evidence of the plaintiff show-
ed he had worked every day he wanted to and was paid 
$1.50 an hour for the time he put in; plaintiff also said 
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he had refused to bag when asked to do so. Of course 
plaintiff did object to defendant working overtime. 
Then the Court said he had "tried to get you two 
brothers to settle your differences, apparently, you can't 
do that." So he finds the defendant guilty of contempt 
because they didn't. Court: "I am going to sentence 
you to 30 days in the county jail, and I am going to sus-
pend that order upon condition that you allay and deter 
and not perform any of the duties, or continue to run the 
business the way you think it should be run upon the 
assumption you're the soul owner of this business, until 
it is adjudicated." The foregoing was deciding one 
of the points at issue of the case before a trial on its 
merits. There is no court decree necessary to dissolve 
a partnership .at will and where notice is given the part-
nership is dissolved on that date. Dow Y. Beals, 268 X.Y. 
Sup. 425. 
After studying the transcript of the hearing on the 
order to show cause and the minute entry, the only con-
clusion that can be reached is that Judge Norseth issued 
no valid order on November 21, 1955 which he signed 
on November 22, 1955 but did not file until December 5, 
1955. 'The plaintiff should have exercised his right to see 
the books kept by defendant after ~\.pril 30, 1955 by 
deposition. 
FINDING NO. 13, to-wit: "That as a result of de-
fendant's acts the partnership business known as Ogden 
Alfalfa Mills shall be dissolved and the affairs of the 
partnership be brought to a conclusion, the partnership 
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sold, and that an accounting be made by the receiver from 
January 1, 1948 until said business is sold and the profits 
be divided between the partners in equal shares after the 
debts, and expenses of the partnership together with its 
di.ssolution are paid." In the first place the provision for 
the division is contrary to the statutes of the state of 
Utah. 
It is indefinite as to what kind of acts on the part 
of the defendant are the reason for dissolving of the 
partnership. According to the agreed facts the defendant 
lawfully dissolved and terminated the partnership on 
April 30, 1955 and agreed to pay the plaintiff the value 
of his share as of that date and the plaintiff acquiesced in 
it. An accounting has been made by the defendant for 
the period from January 1, 1948 to April 30, 1955. And 
not a single figure in the Aditor's Report nor an in-
accuracy except that brought about by the discovery of 
$350.00 investment by the defendant, which the records 
did not show. The inaccuracies in the withdrawal ac~ 
counts of the partners and the beginning inventory of the 
defendant, all of which were brought about by the wilful 
wrongdoings of the plaintiff. Of course, it showed de-
fendant's claim for extra moneys, which were stricken 
by the Court. All that had to be done was for the court 
to appoint a referee to make the accounting, or Def. Exh. 
7 conform with the court's rulings as to withdrawals, 
defendant's beginning inventory and denying of defend-
ant's daim for extra moneys and the stipulations as to 
claim of intervenors and as to the value of the business as 
$35,000.00. 
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The appointment of a receiver is a harsh and expen-
sive remedy that should never be used except where there 
is danger of loss of property or mismanagement and the 
burden is upon the one requesting it to prove those 
dangers. There was not a single complaint by the plain-
tiff of any wrong doing on the part of the defendant dur-
ing the period of the partnership January 1, 1948 to 
April30, 1955. This also applie;:; to Finding No.14, "That 
a receiver shall be appointed whether there is an appeal 
or not to take over the partnership business and property 
forthwith and operate said business until such a time as 
an advantageous sale can be made." 
The whole finding and the similar paragraph of the 
decree is unsupported by the evidence, inequitable and so 
vague that even if the appointment of a receiver was 
justified no one could tell 'when an advantageous sale 
could be made' does that mean a sale for $35,000.00 plus 
receiver's expense or can the receiver sell it for any priceY 
Or can he hold it indefinitely and subject it to a leaching 
proces.s by receiver and attorneys~ Certainly the date of 
sale should be definite and 'advantageous' should have 
been explained. 
So when a supersedeas bond ·was filed by the defend-
ant the receiver's authority ended. 
RESUl\1:E 
The partnership was fonned January 1, 1948 be-
tween Clyde W. and Donal Ferrin after Father A. M. 
had refused to loan $9,000.00 for down payment on the 
business unless Clyde would take Donal in as a partner. 
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Clyde had gone to Los Angeles in May, 194 7 and nego-
tiated an option to buy the business from J. B. Hawks 
on January 1, 1948. Clyde had a capital investment, 
consisting of cash and equipment, valued at $9,080.98 
and set up as such in the books set up by Robert Wangs-
gard, C. P. A., under the direction of plaintiff who had 
agreed to keep the books. Plaintiff kept the records 
in his custody and he testified he delivered the informa-
tion each month to Mr. Wangsgard. The plaintiff now 
estopped to deny Mr. Wangsgard's figures are incorrect. 
The plaintiff had access to the partnership books and 
records of the firm constantly from January 1, 1948 
to April 30, 1955 and at all other times up to date of 
trial except when they were in the hands of the auditor. 
All presumptions of law are against one who should 
have kept books and didn't, 4 7 CJ 1161. 
Plaintiff not only failed to keep the books but he 
gave false information to Mr. Wangsgard, their ac-
countant. He refused to work except when he wanted 
to, would walk off the job without notice and refused 
to assume responsibility for which he was continually 
chided by his brother George. Plaintiff would make 
purchases and charge them to the firm and failed to 
properly allocate Clyde's withdrawals to wages as he 
should have done. Finally he refused to co-sign checks 
to carry on the business unless he was given a sizable 
amount and was quarrelsom'e. 
When Clyde decided it was impracticable to do 
business with him any longer he called the plaintiff in 
and notified him, on the 15th day of April, 1955, that 
on April 30, 1955 he would dissolve and terminate their 
partnership and after that date the defendant would 
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operate the business as his own, and the defendant would 
pay the plaintiff a fair value for his share in the business 
and if the plaintiff wanted to work after that time 
he would be paid by the hour. On April 20th plaintiff 
told the defendant he .was through and that he would 
let defendant know how much he considered his share 
was worth. On April 28, 1955 defendant's counsel re-
ceived a letter from I. Gordon Huggins which informed 
defendant that he had been engaged by A.M. and 
Leonard Ferrin to represent them along with Donal in 
settlement of the Ogden Alfalfa 1\Iill partnership. That 
they had requested him to inform defendant that he 
would have to pay A. M. and Leonard $11,200.00 to 
settle their claims against the firm and that Donal would 
have to be paid $16,200.00 for his share in the p~rtner­
ship business and also that Donal would like an advance 
of at least $350.00. Donal called at the mill on April 29th 
and Clyde gave him a check for $400.00. 
Zieback v. Nasser, (Cal) 82 P 2nd 375, is a very 
good case in point. There a partnership was formed 
to acquire and op·erate theaters and when control of the 
theaters was obtained they were to incorporate plaintiff 
refused to sign the necessary papers so the defendants 
took and operated the business. Plaintiff filed suit for 
dissolution and an accounting. Court held that plain-
tiff's act dissolved the partnership but as no notice \Yas 
given the plaintiff could participate in profits until 
court decreed dissolution. In the case the court dis-
cussed Cal. Civil Code 2432 which is the sa1ne as 48-
35-1 UCA '53. 
In Nuland v. Pnlyn the court held that there are 
two Rules of Law: (1) If partnership was by notice 
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rightfully dissolved by defendants, plaintiffs would have 
been entitled to have their ownership in assets deter-
mined as of date of dissolution and to have payments 
made to them in money or in kind, and if such was not 
done and plaintiff's property was used in partnership 
business, they would be entitled to an election to receive 
their property and to share in the profits made there-
after in proportion their property bore to the whole 
or to be paid interest on the value of their property so 
used. (2) If wrongfully expelled then innocent partner 
is entitled to full participation in the profits from time 
of expulsion until decree of dissolution. See also Vangel 
v. Vangel, 254 P 2nd 919, Forbes v. Becker as annotated 
as to diversion of profits after dissolution; 68 CJS 
Ptsh. 333 (a) and 4 7 OJ 1109 note 38. If the notice of 
dissolution specifies a date in the future at which this 
dissolution will become effective in such case the part-
nership will be dissolved on the day stated. See also 
the Graham v. Street cases as to dissolution and that 
no damages are awarded unless proven. The plaintiff 
did ~ot prove he had suffered any damages at all. 
The defendant was anxious to arrive at an account-
ing as soon as possible and asked the plaintiff for an 
accounting in his counterclaim. The plaintiff not only 
failed to render an accounting, even though he was 
bookkeeper, but he did everything he could to hinder 
the defendant in making an accounting. Had the plain-
tiff joined with the defendant in assisting the auditor 
the defendant E:Xh. 7 would have been an accurate ac-
counting except as to defendant's claim for overtime and 
bagging payments which would have been the only 
question for the court to decide. 
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There was no need of a sale. Parties had stipu-
lated that the fair market value of the business of the 
Ogden Alfalfa Mills partnership was $35,000.00 on April 
30, 1955. 
Where valuation has been fixed by agreement of 
the parties, such valuation will control in the absence 
of fraud, 68 CJ 3 P 901 S 387 (b) ; Edwards v. Arvin, 
114 SW 2nd 778. 
The plaintiff who was the wrongdoer asked for 
the appointment of a receiver in an early Utah case 
which was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court Karrick 
v. Hannan 168 US 328, the court said,"A court of equity 
will not appoint a receiver at the request of a wrong-
doer to unjustly enrich himself by his wrongful acts." 
An appointment of a receiver is a harsh remedy and 
should not be resorted to unless there is danger of loss 
of property, fraud or mismanagement. Tankleff t'. 
Klein, 66 NYS 2nd 81; Lesser & Son 'L". Seymour 218 
P 2nd 536. 
The court could have appointed a 1naster or referee 
to determine amount owed Donal by Clyde. But we 
must remember that the only figures challenged by 
plaintiff in D. Exh. 7 are those pertaining to Clyde's 
claim for extra money. Strange as it is the defendant's 
and plaintiff's stipulation as to withdrawals were not 
much different than those found by the auditor. All 
the report could be adjusted to the courfs decree within 
an hour or two by a good accountant. And as the stipu-
lated sale price "\Ya8 fair according to I~ay Young, as-
sistant trust officer for the Bank. 
If the plaintiff was not satisfied with defendant's 
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accounting why didn't he tender one himself. 
There was no need of a sale even if the plaintiff 
hadn't agreed to the defendant paying him the cash value 
of his share in the assets. See Crowley v. Thompson, 
254 P 2nd 607; Dow v. Beal; Digest kay No. 135. A 
court of equity has power to change manner of sale 
of property in its custody. 
During the period of the partnership which ended 
April 30, 1955, the plaintiff never charged defendant 
with fraud, mismanagement or failure to devote all his 
best endeavors to the business. Clyde carried all the 
responsibility of making the business a success. After 
April 30, 1955 he paid all the obligations that the part-
nership owed at its ending and on July 7, 1955 he bor-
rowed $2,500.00, giving his car as security. In Sept-
ember 1955 he borrowed $5,000.00 from the Globe Mills 
and in October he mortgaged his furniture with other 
property and borrowed $1,400.00, all to finance himself 
and the business, R 144-B 110. 
Finally why should Clyde with years of experience 
in the business affair, together with capital investment, 
take Donal, who had neither money nor skill to invest 
in the business into the partnership and allow Donal 
to make all the terms of the partnership~ 
A court of equity has within its discretion to allow 
interest on defendant's original capital investment of 
$6,759 cash value of hay inventory. 66 ALR 4; Sunstntm 
v. Sunstrum 70 NW 2nd 65. 
The court should have discharged the receiver as 
soon as the defendant put up a supersedeas bond. The 
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purpose of the bond is to put the appellant in status 
quo. 
The court should not have appointed a person 
attorney for the receiver who was attorney for the inter-
venors, and also whose firm was suing the partnership 
on behalf of a creditor. 
The defendant is entitled to have the plaintiff asses-
sed one-half the costs of accounting and all the costs of 
the receivership and all other damages defendant has 
suffered. 
Judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN A. HENDRICKS 
Attorney for Defendant & .Appellant 
712 First Security Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
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